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IMPERIAL ARCHITECTS

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IMPERIAL ARCHITECTS

BEING AN ACCOUNT OF
PROPOSALS IN THE DIRECTION OF A CLOSER
IMPERIAL UNION, MADE PREVIOUS TO THE
OPENING OF THE FIRST COLONIAL
CONFERENCE OF 1887

BY

ALFRED LEROY BURT, B.A.
TORONTO UNIVERSITY AND CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE, OXFORD

WITH AN INTRODUCTION

BY

H. E. EGERTON, M.A.
FELLOW OF ALL SOULS COLLEGE AND BEIT PROFESSOR OF COLONIAL
HISTORY, OXFORD UNIVERSITY



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TO VIND
AMPHILAC

INTRODUCTION

AT a time when the subject of the closer union of the Empire is much to the fore, and when the centripetal forces making for such union are stronger than they were in the past, the story of previous efforts at consolidation, as given in the following essay, will be of interest. Its author is a Canadian Rhodes Scholar ; and, as such, likely to realize the advantages of closer union, and also to appreciate the difficulties that still lie in the way.

With regard to the first part of the volume, which deals with the various proposals made about the time of the American Revolution, little need be said. Such proposals had, nearly in every case, the motive behind them of extracting a revenue from the Americans without doing violence to the principle of

“no taxation without representation”; and, in my opinion, the national temper on both sides of the Atlantic made any real union out of the question. Even in the case of the more recent proposals, contained in the second part of the volume, we note a certain amateurishness and failure to get at the real heart of the situation, which accounts for, and perhaps justifies, their complete failure. One need not be a thick-and-thin supporter of the principle “the best has got to be,” to recognize that our present “imperial architects” are building more carefully and laboriously than did their predecessors; and, so far, are more deserving of success. Still, the opinions of past generations, which Mr. Burt marshals so clearly and succinctly, must be of interest to all—and fortunately their numbers are growing—who are interested in the problem of the British Empire.

H. E. EGERTON.

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IMPERIAL ARCHITECTS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

THE first striking feature that presents itself in the study of proposals making for a closer Imperial unity, up to the meeting of the first Colonial Conference of 1887, is the division of the subject into two periods, separated by quite a lapse of time. The successful revolt of the American Colonies was responsible for this break in the continuity of the development broken by the the intervention later to protract it.

The accomplished fact of American Independence was a rude shock to all Englishmen, and also to many people in America. English ignorance easily accounts for the disbelief in its possibility which had taken such firm root in the British Isles. It is more difficult, however, to explain the similar belief in America.

Otis, in biting terms, satirizes the one, and in quite as enthusiastic language expounds the other. Illustrative of English ignorance, he tells how one Secretary of State conducted affairs, "without knowing whether Jamaica lay in the Mediterranean, the Baltic, or in the moon; letters were often received directed to the Governor of the Island of New England."¹ Concerning American loyalty, he is equally emphatic: "Nothing can eradicate from their hearts their natural, and almost mechanical, affection for Great Britain. . . . We love, esteem, and reverence our Mother Country, and adore our King. And could the choice of independency be offered the Colonies, or subjection to Great Britain upon any terms above absolute slavery, I am convinced they would accept the latter."² If the surprise was so great in America, how much greater was it in England! The shock occasioned by the upsetting of these beliefs was further augmented, in England, by the defeat of English arms.

As with the individual, so with the nation, the great shock compelled retrospection.

¹ Otis, *Rights of the Colonies Asserted and Proved*. Boston, 1764.

² *Ibid.*

Men remembered then what Montesquieu had said about empires growing too extensive. They also recollected, very clearly, Turgot's prophecy of 1750, that Colonies, like fruit, would drop off when ripe. Utter surprise, failure to understand the meaning of the American rebellion, the memory of old prophecies, all combined to uproot the faith in Empire that Chatham had so carefully fostered, and implant in its stead a new prejudice in the English mind—the impossibility of Empire.

Some theories may be futile, but the idea of Empire is one of those that are most like to bring about their own fulfilment. The Imperial Federation League of the eighties realized that the best way to further Imperial Federation was to talk about it. But if the idea may in time create the fact, the absence of that idea operates as strongly in the opposite direction. The absorption of England in the long period of Napoleonic wars, though during its course she gathered up the abundant fragments of the Dutch and French Colonial Empires, detracted more than it added to the Imperial idea. Then succeeded the miserable period of exhaustion, from which sprang the agitation for reform ; and the agitation for

Distrac
tions.

reform gave birth to that Radical Party which ridiculed the idea of Empire.

Responsible
government.

Meanwhile, however, the attention of England was drawn to her overseas dominions, but in a manner more calculated to prevent than to promote closer Imperial unity. English officialdom had not learned the lesson of the American Revolution; hence arose the struggle for colonial self-government. The resistance to this agitation was inspired chiefly by the fear for the integrity of the Empire. The accession of Lord John Russell to power, with Earl Grey as Colonial Secretary, after the fall of Sir Robert Peel's Ministry, saw the end of the struggle. Though Earl Grey laid down the principle that "this country has no interest whatever in exercising any greater influence in the internal affairs of the Colonies than is indispensable, either for the purpose of preventing any one Colony from adopting measures injurious to another, or to the Empire at large,"¹ yet the majority of Englishmen from that time regarded this saving clause as a dead letter from the very nature of the case. They thought that the division of interests between the various

Effect on
English
opinion.

¹ Egerton and Grant, *Canadian Constitutional Development*, p. 297.

Colonies was as great as their geographical separation, and they desired a colonial policy framed accordingly. The Colonies seemed to be a millstone round England's neck ; why not cut them loose ? Lord John Russell spoke the mind of England very moderately when, upon the floor of the House of Commons, he said : " I anticipate, indeed, that some of the Colonies may so grow in population and wealth that some may say, ' Our strength is sufficient to enable us to be independent of England. The link is now become onerous to us. The time is come when we think we can, in amity and alliance with England, maintain our independence.' I do not think that time is yet approaching. But let us make them, as far as possible, fit to govern themselves ; let us give them, as far as we can, the capacity of ruling their own affairs ; let them increase in wealth and population, and, whatever may happen, we of this Empire shall have the consolation of saying that we have contributed to the happiness of the world." ¹ This school of thought, with Goldwin Smith as its chief exponent, held

¹ Speech in House of Commons, February 8, 1850, quoted in Egerton and Grant, *Canadian Constitutional Development*.

the ground for some time, and opposed seriously the rising tide of Imperialism. Thus it was that the continuity in the development of the Imperial idea was completely broken; and from the following discussion will appear how these two periods were not only divided in point of time, but were also distinct in character.

PERIOD I

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

CHAPTER II

THE PROBLEM

IT is not hard to find the prime source from which sprang the proposals of Imperial union in the eighteenth century. The British Empire, as a result, finally, of the great stimulus supplied by Chatham, had expanded territorially out of all proportion to the growth of its constitution or of its basis of taxation. “In order to render any province advantageous to the Empire to which it belongs,” said Adam Smith, “it ought to afford in time of peace a revenue to the public, sufficient not only for defraying the whole expense of its own peace establishment, but for contributing its portion to the support of the general government of the Empire. Every province necessarily contributes, more or less, to increase the expense of that

Discrepancy between geography and constitution of the Empire.

general government. If any particular province, therefore, does not contribute its share towards defraying this expense, an unequal burden must be thrown upon some other part of the Empire. The extraordinary revenue, too, which every province affords to the public in time of war, ought, from parity of reason, to bear the same proportion to the extraordinary revenue of the whole revenue of the whole Empire, which its ordinary revenue does in time of peace. That neither the ordinary nor extraordinary revenue which Great Britain derives from her Colonies bears this proportion to the whole revenues of the British Empire will readily be allowed. Great Britain is, perhaps, since the world began, the only State which, as it has extended its Empire, has only increased its expense without once augmenting its resources. Other States have generally disburthened themselves, upon their subject and subordinate provinces, of the most considerable part of the expense of defending the Empire. Great Britain has hitherto suffered her subject and subordinate provinces to disburthen themselves upon her of almost this whole expense.”¹

¹ Adam Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, book iv., chap. vii., part iii.

Allan Ramsay the younger, in the same year that the *Wealth of Nations* was published, said much the same thing: "Things are now arrived at that point of necessity that Great Britain must sink under the weight of Empire if she doth not extend her taxation in equal proportion as she hath extended her dominion."¹ This was the British point of view which led inevitably to the unhappy attempt to tax the Colonies, which precipitated the whole question. "The Parliament of Great Britain insists upon taxing the Colonies; and they refuse to be taxed by a Parliament in which they are not represented."² Thus was the problem raised, the only solution of which could be the recognition of the general community of interests by binding them up in some form of Imperial unity.

Galloway clearly recognized this community of interests: "Every Colony, as a member of the State, ought to be obliged to contribute toward the defence of the whole Empire, in proportion to the property and wealth which each Colony affords." But the privileges, he

Unity of
interest

¹ Allan Ramsay, *Plan of Reconciliation*, 1776.

² Adam Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, book iv., chap. vii., part iii.

pointed out, as well as the burdens of the Empire should be equally distributed throughout the Empire. "No reason can possibly subsist why the Americans should not enjoy the same rights and privileges which the other subjects of the State do enjoy. Nor can it be of the least consequence to the State whether a subject grows rich by his labour or commerce in the city of London or on the Ohio."¹ The common rights of British citizens were, however, not extended to the Colonies. "Is there a part or a spot of land in America, or are the owners or proprietors thereof, represented in the British Parliament? Or do they in any other manner partake of the supreme power of the State? . . . Is not the British Government as absolute over them as any monarch whatever who singly holds the legislative authority? Are not the persons, lives, and estates of the subjects in America at the disposal of an absolute power, without the least security for the enjoyment of their rights? Most certain it is that this is a situation which people accustomed to liberty cannot sit easy under."²

Not recognized.

¹ Galloway, *Candid Examination of the Mutual Claims of Great Britain and the Colonies*, 1780

² *Ibid.*

Galloway then proceeded to examine the cause of this anomaly : “ From the preceding remarks it partly appears in what manner the American subjects have lost the enjoyment of this estimable right, though not the right itself—namely, by their emigration to a part of the territory of the State for which the constitution had not provided a representation . . . it was passed over in silence as well by the State as the people who emigrated ; but it has neither been forfeited, surrendered, nor lost. And therefore it ought to be restored to them in such manner as their circumstances will admit of whenever it shall be decently and respectfully asked for. Justice to America, and sound policy in respect to both countries, manifestly require it. The emigrants enjoyed in Great Britain the perfect right of English subjects. They left their native country with the consent of the State to increase her commerce, to add to her wealth, and extend her dominions. All this they have effected with infinite labour and expense, and through innumerable difficulties and dangers. In the infant state of their societies they were incapable of exercising this right of participating in the legislative authority in any mode. . . . But

Emigration the cause.

now they are arrived at a degree of opulence and circumstances so respectable, as not only to be capable of enjoying this right, but from necessity, and for the security of both countries, to require it.”¹ The author of a pamphlet on the *Accommodation of Differences with America* tritely summed up the problem, saying, “This or that side of the Atlantic . . . do not dissolve or alter connections or obligations.”²

The position adopted by the stubborn exponents of virtual representation was as foolish and as futile as Camden's assertion that “every blade of grass in the kingdom was represented.” The plain facts remained. England required to extend her basis of taxation. The only power that could claim authority to tax the Colonies was Parliament. But the Colonies would not be taxed by a Parliament in which they were not actually represented. They would not bear their share of the burdens of Empire without a corresponding share in the control of its administration. Here were two opposing

¹ Galloway, *Candid Examination of the Mutual Claims of Great Britain and the Colonies*, 1780.

² *Some Candid Suggestions towards Accommodation of Differences with America*. London, 1775.

claims: the problem was to reconcile them by finding a formula that would satisfy both parties. All the proposals for effecting a closer Imperial unity during the first period were, with one curious exception, the endeavours of many different men to hit upon this suitable formula. Thus all but one of the Imperial proposals during this early period occur during the few short years of the American dispute, for they were not only precipitated but also terminated by it. The leading idea was representation in the British House of Parliament; but it did not monopolize the whole field, for several other suggestions were advanced as possible solutions.

CHAPTER III

COLONIAL REPRESENTATION

Sir
Thomas
Modyford,
1652.

THE first proposal of colonial representation in the British House was made a century before the Stamp Act was passed, and America demanded compensation. This is the one exception referred to above. Its origin is mysterious, for its author, Colonel Thomas Modyford, was a curious individual. It was advanced in 1652, in Barbadoes. He subscribed, with several other leading men of the Colony, to a denunciation of all who adhered to the new Commonwealth Government as superior to the royal régime, but a few days later he deserted to Sir George Ayscue, the commander of the fleet besieging the island. Whether he was moved by the new republican spirit, or by pique against Lord Willoughby, or by mere self-interest, is hard to ascertain. Lord Willoughby, of course, branded him as a traitor. Later, when raised to be Governor of Jamaica, Modyford maintained an incon-

gruous alliance with a band of freebooters. He was finally recalled. It is hard to judge such a man's motives, but his proposal was quite plain. In a letter to John Bradshaw, February 16, 1652, he wrote that the "inhabitants of Barbadoes are now fully satisfied that they have fought for their bondage, and laid down their arms for their liberties; since the composure, they have new spirits in them. Entrusted with a share in the Government, he offers his advice how to preserve what has been gained, and to enlarge the English dominions in the West Indies. The people of Barbadoes would delight to have the same form of government as England, and he desires, although it may seem immodest, that two representatives should be chosen by the island to sit and vote in the English Parliament."¹ In all likelihood it was but a chance suggestion without any serious purpose behind it, for, in his subsequent career as Governor, though he erected an assembly which was not ratified by the King, he did not, as far as can be ascertained, once recur to this idea.

It is doubtful when, or by whom, in the ^{Franklin} eighteenth century, the first suggestion of ¹⁷⁵⁴.

¹ The substance of the letter quoted in the *Calendar of State Papers, West Indies*.

American representatives in the British Parliament was made. Though Franklin was perhaps not the first, yet his proposal is the earliest extant. It was precipitated by the first fear of taxation at the hands of Parliament. In 1754 Mr. Shirley, the predecessor of Pownall, communicated to Franklin, who was in Boston, the profound secret of the project to tax the American Colonies by Act of Parliament. Franklin scented danger, and, in concluding a strong remonstrance against the injustice of the project, suggested representation as the only way out of the difficulty; "an adequate representation in Parliament would probably be acceptable to the Colonists, and would best unite the views and interests of the Empire."¹

William
Knox,
1763.

After the Peace of Paris, William Knox drew up a plan and presented it, through Lord Grosvenor, to the Earl of Bute. Beside the admission of Ireland into the enjoyment of colonial trade and the creation of a colonial aristocracy, Knox advocated colonial representation in the House of Commons. He urged the Earl "to direct the stream of the great men's ambition to this kingdom, and attach them to its prosperity and the jurisdic-

¹ John Adams, *History of the Dispute*, 1754-1774.

tion of Parliament by giving a certain number of them seats in the House of Commons as Colony Representatives."¹ George Grenville, whose name was anathema to all Americans, curiously enough favoured this scheme of colonial representatives. Writing in 1789, Knox said: "It must fill the Americans with astonishment, that the man whom they considered as their greatest enemy, the late Mr. Grenville, approved of my plan . . . he often expressed it to me as his opinion that the Colonies had just ground for complaint in the want of them,² but he did not propose to give them to them, because, as he expressed it, he found the House of Commons would not endure the proposition."³ The reality of this obstacle Knox himself recognized by the time he wrote this account: "It would have been very difficult," he said, "if not impossible, to have carried through Parliament the regulations I proposed."⁴

Pownall also realized the necessity of some Pownall,
radical change. In the dedication of his work to Grenville, he said: "May that minister

¹ Knox, *Extra-official State Papers*, 1789, vol. ii.

² Representatives.

³ Knox, *Extra-official State Papers*, 1789, vol. ii.

⁴ Cf. p. 55.

who shall weave the administration of the colonies into the British administration, as a part essentially united with it, may he live to see the power, prosperity, and honour, that so great and important an event must give to his country ;” and at the outset he remarked that “the taking leading measures towards the forming all those Atlantic and American possessions into one Empire, of which Great Britain shall be the commercial and political centre, is the precise duty of Government at this crisis.”¹

James
Otis, 1764.

About the same time the American, James Otis, advanced a strong claim for colonial representation in the Imperial Parliament. Provoked by the threatening Stamp Act, it was aimed at all who justified England under the plea of virtual representation. Replying to a Halifax gentleman,² he strongly asserted that the British House of Commons were not the representatives of all the plebeian subjects, without, as well as within, the realm. He took Lord Coke’s dictum, that “the House of Commons represents all the commons of England, electors and non-electors,” and

¹ Pownall, *The Administration of the Colonies*, second edition, 1765.

² Otis, *Reply to a Halifax Gentleman*.

construed it literally, laying great stress on "England" as distinct from the Empire. Only the "commons" of *England*, but not of the outside dominions of the British Crown, were represented in Parliament.

In *Rights of the Colonies Asserted and Proved*,¹ he showed how the rights of the Colonists were derived from, and guaranteed by, the British Constitution. No Act of Parliament could deprive them of any of their rights; otherwise the Revolution and the Revolution Settlement were of none effect. "The Colonists will have an equitable right, notwithstanding any such forfeiture of character, to be represented in Parliament, or to have some new subordinate legislature among themselves. It would be best if they had both. . . . A representation in Parliament from the several Colonies, since they are become so large and numerous as to be called on, not to maintain provincial government, civil and military, among themselves—for this they have cheerfully done—but to contribute towards the support of a national standing army, by reason of the heavy national debt, when they themselves owe a large one,

¹ Otis, *Rights of the Colonies Asserted and Proved*. Boston, 1764.

contracted in the common cause, cannot be thought an unreasonable thing, nor, if asked, could it be called an immodest request. 'Qui sentit commodum sentire debet et onus' has been thought a maxim of equity. But that a man should bear a burden for other people, as well as for himself, without a return, never long found a place in any law-book or decrees, but those of the most despotic princes. Besides the equity of an American representation in Parliament, a thousand advantages would result from it. It would be a most effectual means of giving those of both countries a thorough knowledge of each other's interests, as well as that of the whole, which are inseparable. Were this representation allowed, instead of the scandalous memorials and dispositions which have been sometimes, in days of old, privately cooked up in an inquisitorial manner, by persons of bad minds and wicked views, and sent from America to the several boards, persons of the first reputation among their countrymen might be on the spot, from several Colonies, truly to represent them. Future Ministers need not, like some of their predecessors, have recourse for information in American affairs to every vagabond stroller that has run or rid post through America

from his creditors, or to people of no kind of reputation from the Colonies, some of whom, at the time of administering their sage advice, have been as ignorant of the state of affairs of this country as of the regions in Jupiter and Saturn." He then inserted a plea for a Colonial Legislature also. "No representation of the Colonies in Parliament alone would, however, be equivalent to a subordinate legislative among themselves, nor so well answer to the ends of increasing their prosperity and the commerce of Great Britain. It would be impossible for the Parliament to judge as well of their abilities to bear taxes, impositions on trade, and other duties and burthens, or of the local laws that might be really needful, as a legislative here."

He did not leave it long in doubt whether the erection of an American Legislature would mean the withdrawal of the colonial representatives from the British Parliament. His ideal was a grand system or hierarchy of powers under the highest civil authority—the King in Parliament. "Under these it seems easy to conceive subordinate powers in gradation, till we descend to the legislative of a town council, or even a private social club," each having a certain legislative power

bounded by the veto of its immediate superior.

He could not rest satisfied till he had finally demolished the position of those who vindicated the supreme authority of Parliament as it then existed. He had himself appealed to the Constitution, and himself had upheld the supreme power of King in Parliament. Lest any might think he had argued against himself, he proceeded again to the attack. Recounting the various charters and precedents in English history which forbade people to be taxed without their consent being given in Parliament, he continued : " It may be said that these authorities will not serve the Colonists ; the duties laid on them are by Parliament. I acknowledge the difference of fact ; but cannot see the difference in equity, while the Colonists are not represented in the House of Commons. And therefore, with all humble deference, I apprehend that till the Colonists are so represented the spirit of all these authorities will argue strongly in their favour. When the Parliament shall think fit to allow the Colonists a representation in the House of Commons, the equity of their taxing the Colonies will be as clear as their power is at present of doing it without, if they please."

Otis summed up his whole position in the following conclusion : " That by this Constitution every man in the dominions is a free man ; that no part of His Majesty's dominions can be taxed without their consent ; that every part has a right to be represented in the supreme or some subordinate Legislature ; that the refusal of this would seem to be a contradiction in practice to the theory of the Constitution ; that Colonies are subordinate dominions, and are now in such a state as to make it best for the good of the whole that they should not only be continued in the enjoyment of subordinate legislation, but be also represented in some proportion to their numbers and estates, in the grand Legislature of the nation ; that this would firmly unite all parts of the British Empire in the greatest peace and prosperity, and render it invulnerable and perpetual."¹

Governor Bernard of Massachusetts Bay ^{Bernard, 1765-1768.} was another advocate of colonial representation in the British Parliament as a ready solution for the growing difficulties. In a letter written December 14, 1765, he confessed that his ideas upon the subject had

¹ Otis, *Rights of the Colonies Asserted and Proved*. Boston, 1764.

been altered. The admission of American representatives, which he had formerly regarded with indifference, he now considered might be a "useful expedient, or rather a refined stroke of policy."¹ The Americans had been crying out against taxation on the ground that they were not represented, and therefore, he said, the mouths of their agitators could be stopped immediately by the granting of that privilege. This was the "refined stroke of policy" he contemplated. But his views were more far-sighted, and his purpose more far-reaching, than this. The root of the whole evil he discovered to be the faulty system of American government. It needed a complete remodelling. To the accomplishment of this end, the throwing open of Parliament to American members, would be a "useful expedient." Accordingly, with the accomplishment of this great end, the expedient, having fulfilled its purpose, would have lost its value, and the Colonists might be allowed to withdraw. "I do not propose," he said, "American representatives as a perpetual establishment, but only as a temporary ordinance. When the business is done, the

¹ Bernard, *Select Letters on the Trade and Government of America*, letter x,

governments new-modelled, their legislatures established upon constitutional principles and a permanent bottom, and a recognition of the supremacy of the Parliament of Great Britain passed the new legislatures as a first and conditional Act, there will be no longer occasion for American representatives; they might return and serve in their own assemblies, which then may be as separate from that of Great Britain as that of Ireland."¹

But the progress of Bernard's ideas did not stop there, as has been supposed. In a letter of January 28, 1768,² he wrote that, though representation "has been for some time past expedient, it has now become necessary." The language of the whole letter is strongly tinged with the conception of a more permanent union. The following passage can hardly be construed as referring to a temporary representation: "Upon the whole, my lord, if there was no necessity for the appointment of American representatives (which I think there is, and that very pressing), the idea of it greatly enlarges my view of the grandeur of the British Empire. And if there is any danger of it

¹ Bernard, *Select Letters*, etc., letter x.

² *Ibid.*, letter xiii.

falling to pieces, which surely cannot be too much guarded against, it seems to me that *nothing can so effectually provide against so fatal an event as binding the Colonies to the Mother Country by an incorporating Union, and giving them a share in the Sovereign Legislature.* If this was done, there would be no dispute about the rights and privileges of Americans in contradiction to those of Britons ; and an opposition by force to the Government of Great Britain would have but one name. And then we might expect a longer duration to the British Empire than desponding politicians are willing to promise at the present time in its present state.”¹

Franklin,
1766.

About the same time Franklin again advocated representation. But he was absorbed mostly by its relations to taxation. In a letter to some unknown person, written from London, January 6, 1766, he said : “ But if such an union were now established (which methinks it highly imports this country to establish), it would probably subsist as long as Britain shall continue a nation. . . . It is more probable that bringing representatives from the Colonies to sit and act here as members of Parliament, thus uniting and consoli-

¹ Bernard, *Select Letters*, etc., letter xiii.

dating your dominions, would in a little time remove these objections and difficulties, and make the future government of the Colonies easy. But, until some such thing is done, I apprehend no taxes, laid there by Parliament here will ever be collected, but such as must be stained by blood.”¹ His examination before the House or Commons drew forth several strong statements in favour of representation. “They find,” he said, “in the great charter, and the petition and declaration of rights, that one of the privileges of English subjects is that they are not to be taxed but by their common consent; they have therefore relied upon it, from the first settlement of the province, that the Parliament never would nor could, by colour of that clause in the charter, assume a right of taxing them, till it had qualified itself to exercise such a right, by admitting representatives from the people to be taxed, who ought to make a part of that common consent.”²

Grenville favoured the suggestions of Knox, Otis, and Franklin; but Pitt did more than Grenville—he considered actually carrying out these suggestions. Chatham,³ the first

¹ Franklin's *Works*, vol. iv.

² *Ibid.*

³ Basil Williams in the *English Historical Review*, vol. xxii., p. 756.

man to make England realize the importance of the Empire, saw that the troubles with America would never be settled till the relation of responsibility to representation had been determined. In one of his earliest speeches he pointed out that it was unfair to make America contribute to the Imperial revenue, when it was not represented. For some time he considered making the House of Commons a federal assembly, though ultimately his proposal was that the Colonies should contribute through their Assemblies.

Among his papers at the Record Office there are two schemes for Imperial representation. There is one bundle of papers¹ which includes a design for uniting Ireland and the Colonies to the Mother Country. In this, Chatham proposed to summon fifty members from the American and West Indian Colonies to sit in the Commons, and ten to sit in the House of Lords. Ireland was allotted thirty commoners and ten peers (to be elected).

The other plan² is more detailed. Perhaps the details are not his, but of the idea there is

¹ (No. 82), marked "1770, Amor Patriæ."

² (No. 97), marked "North America," dated 1764-1774.

no doubt at all. It was a "Scheme for Better Uniting and Cementing the Mutual Interest and Peace of Great Britain and her Colonies, by Representation in Parliament of Great Britain and Dominions thereto belonging." Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, were each to send four members ; Connecticut, New York, and Jamaica, three each ; Canada, East and West Jerseys, Maryland, and South Carolina, two each ; while the following were granted only one each : Nova Scotia, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, the Lower Counties of Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Georgia, East Florida, West Florida, the Bahamas, Bermuda, Barbadoes, Antigua, St. Christopher, Nevis, Montserrat, and the Grenadines. Members of the first group would not need to send their full quota of four men each, unless they so desired. In the second group, Jamaica might possibly want another member. In the third, Maryland and South Carolina might likewise receive an additional member if they wished. In the fourth, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Barbadoes, and Antigua, might, if they requested it, be granted two members each instead of one. Should any of the smaller islands deem the expense of a single member each to be too much, two or

more of these might join, if they were near and convenient to each other, to elect, either jointly or by turns in rotation, a common member. Dominica, St. Vincent, and Tobago, were left unsettled for the time, presumably till they should be able to support representatives.

To this schedule were added eight conditions :

“(1) These to be elected by each assembly from among themselves.

“(2) It will be needful to exempt them from the same qualifications which are the condition of British members enjoying a seat in Parliament, respecting the value of their estates.

“(3) It may be needful to make a clause in the Act that, on the dissolving any Parliament, the same members which represented America in such dissolved Parliament should continue to represent them in the next ensuing, until others are returned from their respective assemblies in lieu.

“(4) It may be needful that a special distance of time be allowed in the new writs for American members, beyond the usual time in Great Britain, perhaps six (or not exceeding twelve) months.

“(5) The residence (in or near London) of every American member may be constantly required, to be left in writing with the Speaker of the House of Commons.

“(6) In order to prevent the evil effect of any distrust of the Colonists being liable to be overburthened with taxes, beyond their reasonable abilities, it may be enacted that they shall not be liable to any other internal tax than a pound rate on their estates (unless the Assembly of any Colony should petition for another mode to them preferable), which pound rate or tax on their estates, not to exceed 3d. in times of peace or 1s. in time of war, and on these conditions *the Mother Country to protect and defend the whole*, and that without further requisitions.

“(7) It is not unlikely that the Americans may wish for some restrictions on their maritime and inland trade to be taken off in case of an Union, and that may be considered afterwards.

“(8) The Act of Navigation shall at all events be preserved inviolate, and, as the sixth article is in favour of the Colonies to secure their interest, it is but reasonable that this should be added to secure the reasonable interest of the Mother Country.”

Necessity
of mutual
guaran-
tees.

Such conditions were necessary to safeguard the interests of both parties and remove the several objections to the scheme. Writers on both sides of the question betray the necessity of such regulations. A contribution to the revenue and a continuation of the Navigation Law was all that England asked in return for undertaking the duty of defence. When an English writer¹ could say that "America has ever spurned at the thoughts of incorporation, on pretence indeed of its impracticability, but really because it already enjoyed, as we have fairly made out, in the state of its trade, all the advantages of incorporation, while the whole burden of protection was confined to Britain,"² it was high time to guarantee English interests. On the other hand, that the Americans required a similar guarantee is readily seen in a couple of passages from another pamphlet:³ "Some theorists make a proposal to allow the Americans a representation in the British Parliament, in order to justify our taxation of them ; but from the small number of such representatives, which I have under-

¹ *A Plan of Reunion between England and her Colonies*. London, 1778.

² Cf. p. 51. ³ *American Independence*. London, 1775.

stood to be proposed, and their being restricted from voting, as some would have them, in any but American questions, I should fear that this proposal proceeded from a sense of shame, as not appearing to preserve even the common forms of justice, rather than from a strict and sacred regard to justice itself; or on a supposition that this representation should be an adequate one, how would it be possible for the American representatives to serve their constituents in a proper manner?" The author appealed to the poor communication between the two continents, and branded the scheme as a weak system of government, "the visionary suggestion of a dream." Nor was this all; he actually doubted the faith binding the representatives and the constituents. "Will they trust their property, their freedom, their dearest rights, their everything, in the hands of exiles sent half-way to the Antipodes, in order to sit in a council for their government?" Thus, Chatham, or whoever drew up the plan, was wise in appending such restrictions.

In 1770 there appeared another scheme, under the long title of *Considerations on the Expediency of Admitting Representatives from the American Colonies into the British* ^{"Con- sidera- tions of Represen- tation," 1770.}

House of Commons. It is well worth quoting at length. The inequality and hardship in the relations of America and Great Britain, the author said, were unavoidable, in a way, since British subjects continued under the sovereignty of Parliament wherever they might go throughout the world. "But yet the total want of representatives in the Great Council of the nation, to support their interests and give effect on their own behalf to laws and taxes by which they are bound and affected, is a misfortune which every friend to liberty and equal government must be sorry to see them labour under, and from which he must wish them to be relieved in a regular and constitutional manner, if such relief can possibly be afforded them without breaking the unity of the British Government. I put in this restriction because otherwise the cure would be worse than the disease. . . . It would be both equitable and expedient to endeavour, if possible, to remove this inconvenience, and raise them to a level with their fellow-subjects in Great Britain. Now, the natural and obvious way of doing this, and which is likewise agreeable to precedents of very respectable authority, is to admit the American Colonies to a share in the public

councils of the nation by sending members to the British Parliament. . . . About fourscore persons might be admitted to sit in Parliament, as members of the Commons' House of Parliament for all the King's dominions in America, the West Indies as well as America, and their title might be that of *Commissioners of the Colonies of America*. This number would be about four members for each separate colony upon an average : but they should not all send exactly the same number of representatives ; but some should send only two, others four, others five or six, and Pennsylvania perhaps eight ; the appointment of the members to be sent by each Colony being to be settled by an Act of Parliament upon a due consideration of their extent, wealth, numbers of inhabitants, and contribution to the public expense of the nation."

Then succeed a number of regulations similar to those in Chatham's plan, and framed to the same end—the mutual guarding of American and British interests, and the removal of hindrances in the way of representation. " These members should be permitted to sit in the House of Commons without having £300 a year in land, or any other peculiar qualification, as is allowed with

respect to the Scottish members and those for the two Universities of Oxford and Cambridge. They shall be chosen every year on a certain appointed day, which might be the 1st of August, by the Assemblies of the several provinces for which they were to be Commissioners. And this should be done, of course, without the King's writ or summons. On these occasions they should receive a Commission in writing from their electors, expressed as near as may be, in the words of the writ of the summons, and consequently empowering them to sit and vote in the British House of Commons, and consult with the King and the great men of the kingdom and the Commons of the same in Parliament assembled, upon the great affairs of the nation, and to consent, on behalf of the province for which they are chosen, to such things as shall be ordained in the Parliament, in all such meetings thereof as shall be holden by the King, his heirs and successors, from the day of their election until the same day in the following year, and further until such time as another Commission of the same kind shall be given by the said Assembly either to them or to other persons in their stead, to represent the said province for another year, and shall be produced and read

in the British House of Commons. Two or more original Commissions of this kind should be sent over to England by different ships, in order to guard against accidents of the sea ; and there would be a moral certainty that at least one of them would always be in England before the first day of November." Thus also was removed the objection some had raised, that in an emergency there would be no time to send writs to America. Commissioners with full power of attorney would always be present in England.

The headquarters of the Government, he said, being in London would be a due recognition of England's superior position, while the consequent disadvantages of America's distance from the scene of action would be counterbalanced by the advantage over the British constituencies of choosing their Commissioners yearly. "Further, though the authority of the British Parliament, especially when it shall have been thus augmented by the admission of these Commissioners from the American Colonies, must be allowed to be supreme and incontestable, and all their Acts of every kind must be entitled to universal obedience ; yet, I conceive, it would be a proper rule to be observed in practice,

and to be made a standing order of both Houses of Parliament, never to pass any law, whether for imposing a tax or for regulating trade, or for any other purpose whatsoever, relating to any of the American Colonies, till one whole year after the first reading of the Bill; unless it be to renew some expiring laws of great importance, and of immediate and urgent necessity, such as the Act for billeting the King's troops, and perhaps some few others that might be specially excepted in the order. The observation of this rule would give the several Colonies that were likely to be affected by the intended law an opportunity of making proper representations against it, and would consequently be the means of preventing the Parliament from making injudicious laws not suited to the condition of the Colonies, from want of proper information concerning them; the danger of which is one of the principal reasons alleged by American writers against the expediency of the British Parliament's undertaking to make laws for America.

“Lastly, this legislative power of the Parliament should be exercised but seldom and on occasions of great necessity. Whatever related to the internal government of any

particular Colony (such as raising the necessary taxes for the support of its civil government, and passing laws for building bridges, or churches, or barracks, or other public edifices) should be left to the Governor and Assembly of that Colony to transact among themselves, unless in cases where the domestic dissensions of the Colony put a stop to public business and created a kind of necessity for the interposition of the Supreme Legislature. But when any general tax was to be imposed upon all the American Colonies for the support of a war, or any other such general purpose ; or any new law was to be made to regulate the trade of all the Colonies ; or to appoint the method by which debts owing from the inhabitants of one Colony to those of another, or of Great Britain, should be recovered ; or to direct the manner of bringing criminals to justice who have fled from one Colony into another ; or to settle the manner of quartering the King's troops in the several Colonies, or of levying troops in them, and the number each Colony should contribute ; or to settle the proportional value of different coins that should be made current in the several provinces, or to establish a general paper currency through America ; or

for any other general purpose that relates to the several Colonies : in these cases the authority of Parliament should be employed, and would be found to be a blessed bond of union to all the various dominions of which the British Empire is now composed."

The Colonies, he said, might pay their representatives £1,000 a year. Those few, however, who might not be able to afford such expenditure could easily find men to perform gratis the duties of Commissioners. There would, he pointed out, be three classes of men from which to choose. First there were the Governors and other English officials who had gained the confidence of the Colonists. Then there were the English merchants in London and elsewhere who trade to America ; their interests would be sufficiently identified with those of America for them to undertake the responsibility of being representatives. Finally there was the English landed gentry who would purchase land in the Colony and reside there for a while to become familiar with its spirit.

Thus the objection some had raised, that the Colonies could neither find representatives nor afford to send them, was easily removed. Indeed, there was little doubt in

the author's mind that colonial representatives would do all that could be desired. Scotland,¹ he said, had only forty-five members, yet they sufficed to protect Scotch interests. In proportion to their population or the extent of their kingdom, the Scotch contributed a smaller proportion to the combined funds than did the English. Not content with that illustration, the author turned to the West Indies. Several rich proprietors, he remarked, had returned to England, and, having secured seats in Parliament for several boroughs, were thought to possess sufficient interest to procure many important favours for that part of America.

The only problem remaining was how to introduce such a plan. The proper way certainly was for the Colonies to make humble requests to His Majesty and to Parliament, acknowledging their sovereignty, and praying for such a scheme. But the American Colonies were too much torn by faction, he admitted, and for harmony's sake Great Britain could easily sacrifice her dignity. "Let her make the above proposal, or some other more wisely contrived, but founded on the same principles of equity, to every British

¹ Cf. p. 59.

Colony in America without further delay, by passing an Act of Parliament to empower the several Colonies to send the proper number of Commissioners to the British House of Commons within the next year following the date of the Act. It is probable that many Colonies will immediately comply with the proposal, and send their representatives to Parliament ; and if they do, it may reasonably be supposed that the other Colonies will not long refuse to follow their example."

Dean
Tucker.

Many proposals of colonial representation in the British House were current at this time. Even Tucker, the "gloomy Dean" of Gloucester, suggested, as a possible plan, "to persuade the Colonies to send over a certain number of deputies, or representatives, to sit and vote in the British Parliament, in order to incorporate America and Great Britain into a common Empire."¹

*A Letter to
Dr. Tucker,*
1774.

Another pamphleteer,² writing upon the greatest trouble of those troublous times, said "What we want is a Constitution for the British Empire." The solution of this problem, he remarked, was right to hand. It consisted merely in "taking the Constitu-

¹ Quoted in *American Independence*. London, 1775.

² *A Letter to Dr. Tucker*, 1774.

tion of Great Britain, and applying it to the respective provinces" of the Empire, giving complete self-government to each, and reserving for the British Parliament only the supreme power, which should be exerted, not in taxation, but in dealing with great crises in the welfare of the whole Empire. "Though it may be absurd to suppose that the whole British Empire (even such as it is to-day) should be represented at Westminster, yet, perhaps, it might be the means of giving greater compactness to the whole Empire if every Assembly was allowed to furnish one member to the House of Commons; to have a right to his seat for seven years, and after that time to sit till another should be deputed in his stead."¹

This presents a marked contrast to the other proposal, where the Colonies were each to possess several representatives elected yearly.² Perhaps the author had in mind the Septennial Bill, in fixing the period during which the colonial representatives were to sit, and he might, judging from the scant nature of the plan, have intended the colonial members to sit only during one Parliament, and to be re-elected after each dissolution. It is more

¹ *A Letter to Dr. Tucker*, 1774.

² Cf. p. 36.

kely, however, that they were meant to bear the character of permanent semi-diplomatic representatives, chosen as such because the size of the House of Commons combined with the magnitude of the Empire to preclude any system of popular representation.

Whichever be the case, it is certain from the following words that he took a wide, statesmanlike view of the Empire : " The Constitution that is approved of should be the Constitution of the whole Empire ; there can be no local peculiarities that should make it good for one and worse for another : neither ought it to be confined to America, but in every other part of the world where a territory belonging to the Crown of Great Britain may be important enough to merit its being declared by a vote of Parliament to constitute a part of the British Empire, that vote should give it a right to the common Constitution."¹

Adam
Smith,
1776.

In 1776 appeared Adam Smith's great work, and in it he has enshrined forever his advocacy of colonial representation as the sole solution of the American difficulty, and the only way to bind the two continents

¹ *A Letter to Dr. Tucker, 1774.*

together.¹ "If to each Colony," he wrote, "which should detach itself from the general confederacy, Great Britain should allow a number of representatives as suited the proportion of what it contributed to the public revenue of the Empire, in consequence of its being subjected to the same taxes, and in compensation admitted to the same freedom of trade with its fellow-subjects at home—the number of its representatives to be augmented as the proportion of its contribution might afterwards augment—a new method of acquiring importance, a new and more dazzling object of ambition, would be presented to the leading men of each Colony. Instead of piddling for the little prizes which are to be found in what may be called the paltry raffle of colonial faction, they might then hope, from the presumption which men naturally have in their own ability and good-fortune, to draw some of the great prizes which sometimes come from the wheel of the great State lottery of British politics."² Unless this or some other method is fallen upon—and there seems to be none more obvious than this—of preserving the importance and of gratifying

¹ *Wealth of Nations*, book iv., chap. vii., part iii.

² Cf. p. 16.

the ambition of the leading men of America, it is not very probable that they will ever voluntarily submit to us, and we ought to consider that the blood which must be shed in forcing them to do so is, every drop of it, the blood either of those who are, or of those whom we wish to have for, our fellow-citizens. . . .

“ Though the Roman Constitution, therefore, was necessarily ruined by the union of Rome with the allied States of Italy,¹ there is not the least probability that the British Constitution would be hurt by an union of Great Britain and her Colonies. That Constitution, on the contrary, would be completed by it, and seems to be imperfect without it. The Assembly which deliberates and decides concerning the affairs of every part of the Empire, in order to be properly informed, ought certainly to have representatives from every part of it. That this union, however, could be easily effectuated, or that difficulties, and great difficulties, might not occur in the execution, I do not pretend. I have yet heard of none, however, which appear insurmountable. The principal perhaps arises, not from the nature of things, but from the

¹ Cf. p. 91.

prejudices¹ and opinions of the people, both on this and on the other side of the Atlantic.

“ We on this side the water are afraid lest the multitude of American representatives should overturn the balance of the Constitution, and increase too much either the influence of the Crown on one hand, or the force of democracy on the other. But, if the number of the American representatives were to be in proportion to the produce of American taxation, the number of the people to be managed would increase exactly in proportion to the means of managing them, and the means of managing to the number of people to be managed. The monarchical and democratic parts of the Constitution would, after the union, stand exactly in the same degree of relative force with regard to one another as they had done before.

“ The people on the other side the water are afraid lest their distance from the seat of government might expose them to many oppressions ; but their representatives in Parliament, of which the number ought from the first to be considerable, would easily be able to protect them from all oppression. The distance would not much weaken the

¹ Cf. p. 55 *et seq.*

dependency of the representative upon the constituent, and the former would still feel that he owed his seat in Parliament, and all the consequence which he derived from it, to the good-will of the latter. It would be the interest of the former, therefore, to cultivate that good-will, by complaining, with all the authority of a member of the Legislature, of every outrage which any civil or military officer might be guilty of in those remote parts of the Empire. The distance of America from the seat of government, besides, the natives of that country might flatter themselves, with some appearance of reason, too, would not be of very long continuance. Such has hitherto been the rapid progress of that country in wealth, population, and improvement, that in the course of little more than a century, perhaps, the produce of the American might exceed that of the British taxation. The seat of Empire would then naturally remove itself to that part of the Empire which contributed most to the general defence and support of the whole."¹

This is the utterance of a great prophet. Though Americans might believe Phila-

¹ Adam Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, 1776, book iv., chap. vii., part iii.

delphia to be "the future capital of an American Empire, in which the British Isles and possessions should be absorbed,"¹ few Englishmen indeed could have reconciled themselves to the situation suggested. But Adam Smith lived far above such petty pride and local jealousy.

What fairer exposition of the case could be desired? He saw that the existing conditions irritated many promising American speakers, and provoked them into being mere popular agitators. All they wanted was a safety-valve. His keen perception cut to the root of the matter, as none other could, and laid bare the chief obstacle to the adoption of colonial representation—the prejudices of England and America. But his perception was equalled by his wisdom in proving to each side that they had nothing to fear and everything to hope for; that their interests were one; and that greatness lay in union.

It would be a natural supposition that the Declaration of Independence, published in the same year with the *Wealth of Nations*, would have precluded any further proposals of colonial representation, leaving Adam Smith's

*A Plan of
Reunion
1778.*

¹ Knox, *Extra-official State Papers*, vol. ii.

the last and the greatest plan for an Imperial legislative union. But the ever-sanguine character of human nature defies such reasoning. In 1778 was published another plan¹ of Parliamentary union.

The author considered colonial representation to be still quite practicable: "And though the case of America, by its not possessing an immediate share in the Legislature, may seem to differ from this . . . it differs more in appearance than reality; and even this seeming difference is easily taken away by allowing them a representation, if, indeed, they would accept of it."

Discussing the Empire, its members, and a closer union of them, he said: "The head of the Empire may communicate its privileges and legislative powers to any of, or all, the other provinces, by incorporating them with itself and giving them the full rights of citizens. Even in this case the seat of government and weight of legislative power—at least, in respect of each separate incorporated province—must still be considered as continuing with the Parent Country; the other provinces being sufficiently secured in an equal treat-

¹ *A Plan of Reunion between Great Britain and her Colonies.* London, 1778.

ment by the abolition of all partial distinctions, privileges, and hardships, by the universal and undistinguishing operation and extension of all privileges on the one hand, of all imposts and burdens on the other, particularly by the general tenor, expression, and comprehension of all statutes, impositions, or taxes. To this point may be referred the incorporation of Scotland by the Union. I shall observe here that whenever subordinate provinces show a reluctance to an incorporation with the Parent State, which is the highest privilege that can be conferred upon them, it is a shrewd sign that in their state of subordination they enjoy, or think they enjoy, exemptions and privileges incompatible with the general good.”¹ This he urged as his reason for persisting, in the face of all apparent obstacles, in advancing the cause of Parliamentary union of the Empire.

He then appealed to historical analogies, which at that time were so popular. “Chester and Durham paid taxes before they were represented, nor in their petitions did they say they ought not to pay taxes, but, as they paid taxes, that they ought to be represented. Let the same application be used in the present

¹ Cf. p. 32.

dispute ; and if the privilege be refused, then will America have cause to complain. A legislative body that has the public good in view will be desirous of drawing information from every province, and that information will come most constitutionally from representatives, admitted from each, to share with the Sovereign in all the rights of legislation. . . . That there would be a propriety in admitting representatives from America into Parliament, for information concerning the states and ability of their constituents, and for collecting more especially the sense of the several parts of the Empire, I readily acknowledge. Nor, if it were properly proposed, is it probable that Parliament either could or would refuse to admit such into their consultations. Though there want not other pretences, nothing hinders it but that jealousy in the Americans of everything which seems to tie them to, or reminds them of, their dependence on the Mother Country. . . . If Parliament should adopt the measure of American representatives, and the plan is as practicable as that of American agents, which has so long obtained, the present troubles are the fittest time to bring it about."

Thus he turned the dispute with America

inside out, and used it to prove, not the impracticability, but the urgent necessity and present possibility of American representatives being admitted into the British Parliament.

After the acceptance of the principle, the details, he said, could be easily arranged. "Five members would be a sufficient number from the more populous Colonies, and there should not be fewer than three from the smallest, that they might be a kind of Private Committees, each to prepare the Parliamentary business of the Colony. Their Provincial Councils and Assemblies might return each to their Governor double the number to be appointed, who should make an election and commission the proper representatives." This he seems to have designed as a safeguard against the introduction of troublesome firebrands from the young Colonies. "Some of them might go out by rotation every year, their Councils and Assemblies determining the persons to go out, and presenting, as at first, to the Governor twice the number wanted to succeed them ; but none who had been passed over by the Governor should, during that Parliament, be offered again for his approbation."

In fixing the relation between the Imperial and the Colonial Legislatures, he concluded that "no Colony regulation, therefore, ought to be final, and in matters of trade particularly should have no effect, till it has undergone a critical examination in Parliament, and has been found compatible with the general interest of the Empire." But this, he said, "will throw much new business into the hands of the Ministry and Parliament, which their present forms are but ill adapted to accelerate and bring to issue, and for which the latter, particularly, could not possibly find time."

He found, however, a ready method of obviating the difficulty thus raised. "The whole might be made easy, and to fall in with the present listlessness in public business, by the appointment of proper committees, and admitting, as we have proposed, delegates from the Colonies, we will naturally become members of the committees, and push forward the business of their respective Colonies. Agreeable to this plan of the superintending care of Parliament, let every Act of the Provincial Legislature go through the present Colony forms. Let all the arguments for and against any new regulation, or abolition of the old, be fairly stated in writing, for the infor-

mation of Parliament, by the consent of the managers on both sides of the question in the Colony Legislature. . . . Let the sanction of Parliament be necessary for every regulation respecting trade, and every perpetual provincial law. . . . To prosecute the idea, let the Assemblies in each province, assisted by their best lawyers, review the whole Colony Acts, and state each with the arguments for and against it, for the inspection and determination of Parliament, or at least a Committee of it, the Colony agents, or representatives in Parliament, managing the debates, and carrying the Bills through the necessary forms. . . . To conclude, if our plan of incorporation and equal taxation should take place, the union between Great Britain and her Colonies would be strengthened, the energy of Government would be felt in the most distant provinces, and the whole, co-operating to one point of equal liberty and equal law, would flourish, invincible by any force."¹

This completes the tale of proposals for a legislative union. To be successful, they pre-
 supposed a certain degree of mutual sympathy

Was representation possible

¹ *A Plan of Reunion between Great Britain and her Colonies.* London, 1778.

Feeling
before
taxation.

between America and Great Britain, the absence of which would rule the whole question out of court. Whatever may have been the case before 1765, it is very doubtful whether after that date it was sufficiently strong to allow of a workable representation. In his examination before the House of Commons,¹ Franklin, when interrogated as to the attitude of America previous to 1763, replied: "They had not only a respect, but an affection, for Great Britain—for its laws, its customs and manners, and even a fondness for its fashions, that greatly increased the commerce. Natives of Britain were always treated with particular regard; to be an Old England man was of itself a character of some respect, and gave a kind of rank among us." "They considered the Parliament as the great bulwark and security of their liberties and privileges, and always spoke of it with the utmost respect and veneration." To a question concerning the temper in 1766, on the other hand, his curt reply, "Oh, very much altered," was eloquent with the ill-feeling subsisting between the two countries. In a letter² written early in 1766 he expressed this change very clearly. "The

Feeling
after
taxation.

¹ Franklin's *Works*, vol. iv.

² *Ibid.*

time," he wrote, "has been when the Colonies would have esteemed it a great advantage, as well as honour, to be permitted to send members to Parliament; and would have asked for that privilege, if they could have had the least hopes of attaining it. The time is now come when they are indifferent about it, and will probably not ask it, though they might accept it if offered to them; and the time will come when they will certainly refuse it. . . . This people," he continued, referring to the English, "is too proud, and too much despises the Americans, to bear the thought of admitting them to such an equitable participation in the government of the whole."

The alienation of sympathy appeared very clearly in the New York Congress held in 1765 on the subject of the Stamp Act, where two of the resolutions passed ran as follows :

Opposi-
tion to
represen-
tation :
America.

"III. That it is inseparably essential to the freedom of a people, and the undoubted right of Englishmen, that no taxes be imposed on them, but with their own consent, given personally or by their representatives.

"IV. That the people of these Colonies are not, and from their local circumstances

cannot be, represented in the House of Commons in Great Britain.”¹

England.

In England the suggestion of representation was in some quarters actually scoffed at. Belief in the authority of Parliament was equalled only by the assurance of the strength of British arms. The language of one pamphleteer was positively insulting: “One method indeed has been hinted at, and but one, that might render the exercise of this power in a British Parliament just and legal, which is the introduction of representatives from the several Colonies into that body; but, as this has never been seriously proposed, I shall not here consider the impracticability of this method nor the effects of it, if it could be practised; but only say that I have lately seen so many specimens of the great powers of speech, of which these American gentlemen are possessed, that I should be much afraid that the sudden importation of so much eloquence at once would greatly endanger the safety and government of this country—or, in terms more fashionable, though less understood, this our most excellent Constitution. If we can avail ourselves of these taxes on no other condition, I shall never look upon

¹ Almon, *Prior Documents*, p. 27.

it as a measure of frugality ; being much cheaper for us to pay their army than their orators.”¹

The author of *Some Candid Suggestions*² also seemed to favour representation, but he dismissed it as an inadequate solution of the pressing troubles. “ Suppose an alternative was offered to them,” he said, “ of a proper representation allowed them, as is for Scotland, their objection of distance is ridiculous, because they have many natives and friends in Britain out of whom to make choice, besides other friends who constantly reside in Britain, as evidently appears from the daily publications, and other appearances in their favour. And in such case, or upon increase of trade, which is certainly by agreement, many more will reside in Britain, and others have property there. But the futility of a small representation in Parliament is evident from the case of Scotland ;³ by their small proportion of members, they have never received any particular good, nor

Inadequacy of representation.

¹ *Objections to the Taxation of our American Colonies by the Legislature of Great Britain briefly considered.* London, 1765.

² *Some Candid Suggestions towards Accommodation of Differences with America*, 1775.

³ Cf. p. 41.

escaped any inconvenience by it; and yet, from seventy years' experience, they are much benefited by the union, which trusted all to the justice and generosity of the English. The English are justly entitled to a large majority in Parliament. What can a small proportion do, Unless *a vote by one* was established, the fatal effects of which, though intended by a false zeal for liberty, is sadly found in Poland."

American
Independence
opposed.

His contemporary,¹ the advocate of a Grand British League, was by no means so patient. He ridiculed the proposal without deigning even to explain why it was impossible. "That an union with America," he wrote, "by means of admitting American representatives in the British Parliament, is the wildest of all chimeras."

Prejudice
recognized
by
Galloway.

There were several men who were partial to representation, but who dropped it because of the insurmountable prejudice that stood in the way. The Principality of Wales, said Galloway,² the Bishopric of Durham, and the Palatinate of Chester, laboured, just as America, under the grievance of being

¹ *American Independence*, 1775, letter xii.

² J. Galloway, *Candid Examination of the Mutual Claims of Great Britain and the Colonies*, 1780.

bound by the authority of Parliament without sharing the direction of that authority. They petitioned for a share, and their claim was recognized. When Henry VIII., he continued, conquered Calais, and settled it with English merchants, it was so incompatible with English liberty to be otherwise, that Calais representatives were incorporated in the English Parliament. But the existing prejudice, he recognized, placed an absolute veto upon the application of this theory : " it is an universally prevailing opinion that the Colonies cannot be represented in Parliament."

As the greatest advocate of representation was Adam Smith, so its most reasonable opponent was Edmund Burke.¹ Like Gallo-
way, Burke strongly favoured the absolute principle of representation. " The Colonies complain," he said, " that they have not the characteristic mark and seal of British freedom. They complain that they are taxed in a Parliament in which they are not represented. If you mean to satisfy them at all, you must satisfy them with regard to this complaint. If you mean to please any people, you must give them the boon which

¹ *Conciliation with America.*

they ask, not that which you may think better for them." He lost his temper with those who pleaded virtual representation as a justification of the *status quo*. "What!" he exclaimed, "does the electric force of virtual representation more easily pass over the Atlantic than pervade Wales, which lies in your neighbourhood ; or than Chester and Durham, surrounded by the abundance of representation that is actual and palpable ?" Wales, Durham, and Chester, he pointed out, had been pacified only by the grant of actual representation in the British Parliament. On this analogy, the whole American problem might be solved by representation, if it were possible. But there was the rub. He admitted that he inclined toward Imperial representation, but continued immediately to say that the "eternal barriers of creation" blocked the way. His third resolution before the House was a recognition of this insurmountable obstacle. It read as follows : "That, from the distance of the said Colonies, and from other circumstances, no method hath hitherto been devised for procuring a representation in Parliament for the said Colonies."¹ But this resolution refers to another great

¹ *Conciliation with America.*

difficulty in the way—human nature. The other circumstances to which he referred he passed over quickly, but they were there. America did not want it, despite what their leaders said, nor was England ready to grant it. “I am sure it is not desired by them, nor ought it perhaps by us; but I abstain from opinions.” Thus, in the mind of Burke, did the fact of prejudice combine with nature to make representation impossible.

Whether Burke was correct in his judgment, or whether, as Adam Smith thought, this prejudice might have been overcome, it is impossible to decide at this distance of time: it can only be now, as it was then, a matter of opinion.

CHAPTER IV

AN AMERICAN PARLIAMENT

WHEN Independence raised its head in America, the cause of representation, whatever chances it had once possessed, began to decline. Though the author of the *Letter to Dr. Tucker* in 1774, Adam Smith in 1776, and the author of *A Plan of Reunion* in 1778, still advocated representation, others cast about for some other expedient which would better satisfy these new cries for independence. The best way to satisfy this demand, while preserving at the same time the integrity of the British Empire, seemed to be the institution of an American Parliament.

Joseph
Galloway,
1774.

Joseph Galloway, the leader of the loyalists, was the first to propose such a solution. His plan was first submitted to the Philadelphia Congress in 1774. Six years later, in London, he republished it with an explanation and short history of the dispute. His party at the Congress having resolved to

present a plan to their colleagues, with the twofold purpose of securing peace and harmony with Great Britain, and of ascertaining exactly the ultimate design of the republicans and how far short of independence they would stop, selected their leader, Galloway, to draw up such a scheme.

That he did not construct a mere makeshift, and that he took a broad, statesman-like view of the situation, is quite evident in the speech with which he introduced the plan.¹ "I wish to see . . . the right to participate in the supreme councils of the State extended, in some form, not only to America, but to all the British dominions; otherwise I fear that the profound and excellent fabric of civil polity will ere long crumble to pieces. The case of the Colonies is not a new one. It was formerly the very situation of Wales, Durham, and Chester. As to the tax, it is neither unjust nor oppressive, it being rather a relief than a burthen; but it is the want of constitutional principle in the authority that passed it which is the ground for complaint. . . . Here, and here only, is the defect; and if this defect were

¹ Galloway, *Rise and Progress of the American Rebellion*. 1780.

removed, a foundation would be laid for the relief of every American complaint. . . . I would therefore acknowledge the necessity of the supreme authority of Parliament over the Colonies, because it is a proposition which we cannot deny without manifest contradiction, while we confess that we are subjects of the British Government ; and if we do not approve of a representation in Parliament, let us ask for a participation in the freedom and power of the English Constitution in some other mode of incorporation."

In another pamphlet,¹ published in the same year, he described the fierce opposition his plan aroused among the republicans. His *Candid Examination* was a reprint of two papers published originally in America at the beginning of the rebellion, in order to persuade the Colonists to come to an accommodation with Great Britain. The first was circulated throughout America, and had considerable influence upon the minds of the better class of people. For this reason it was destroyed by the party of Independence wherever and whenever they could find it. On several occasions it was publicly burnt by

¹ Galloway, *Candid Examination of the Mutual Claims of Great Britain and the Colonies*. 1780.

the common executioner. The second was just about to be issued from the press, and was advertised by Rivington the printer, of New York. But it did not reach the public. A party of Whigs from Connecticut swooped down on the day of publication, carried off and destroyed the printing materials, drove the author into exile, and finally overthrew the liberty of the Press in America. These were the two papers he republished in 1780 in London to vindicate his position in America, and to make a last effort to reconcile England and her daughter upon constitutional principles.

It is very regrettable that his proposal was made at such a late date, for it possessed considerable excellence. "There is no proposition more firmly established," said he, "in the conduct of mankind, than that there must be in every State a supreme legislative authority, universal in its extent, over every member." The rights of America, he pointed out, were solely derived from the British Constitution. Examining this Constitution, he said: "The Lords and Commons, who hold so large a share in the legislative authority, derive their right from, and represent the lands within, the realm; . . . this power of legislation in the

people, derived from the share they held in the lands, was originally, and yet is, of the essence of the English Government; and ever was, and still continues to be, the only check upon the encroachments of power, the great security against oppression, the main support of the freedom and liberty of the English subjects. And its excellence consists in affording to every part of the realm an opportunity of representing, by their delegates, at all times, their true circumstances, their wants, their necessities, and their danger, to the supreme authority of the nation, without a knowledge of which it is impossible to form just or adequate laws. But what are the circumstances of the American subjects? Is there a part or a spot of the lands in America, or are the owners or proprietors thereof represented in the British Parliament?"

Some readjustment was necessary. "The subjects of a free State in every part of its dominions, ought, in good policy, to enjoy the same fundamental rights and privileges. Every distinction between them must be offensive. . . . If the British State, therefore, means to retain the Colonies in a due obedience to her Government, it will be

wisdom in her to restore to her American subjects the enjoyment of the right of assenting to, and differing from, such bills as shall be proposed to regulate their conduct. Laws thus made will ever be obeyed ; because by their assent they become their own acts. . . . The genius, temper, and circumstances of the Americans should be also duly attended to. No people in the world have higher notions of liberty. It would be impossible ever to eradicate them. . . . The distance of America from Britain, her vast extent of territory, her numerous ports and conveniences of commerce, her various productions, her increasing numbers, and consequently her growing strength and power, when duly considered, all point out the policy of uniting the two countries together, upon the principles of English liberty. Should this be omitted, the Colonies will infallibly throw off their connection with the Mother Country. Their distance will encourage the attempt, their discontent will give them spirit, and their numbers, wealth, and power, at some future day, will enable them to effect it."

Galloway advanced a most curious reason for the Colonies remaining united with Great Britain. "If it be the interest of the

Mother Country to be united with the Colonies, it is still more to their interest that the union should take place." Each Colony, he remarked, possessed full legislative control over its own local affairs ; they had nothing in common ; in their relation to each other they were independent societies. They had " different forms of government, productions of soil, and views of commerce ; different religions, tempers, and private interests." Accordingly, he argued, their mutual suspicions would ever preclude concord, and their only hope of mutual harmony and prosperity was in union with the Mother Country. Though history gave the lie direct to Galloway in this prophecy, still many held the same idea at that time.

His proposal carried so much weight that when submitted to the Congress it was passed by a majority of one Colony. The party of Independence, much alarmed, whipped up their supporters, reversed this decision, and expunged all record of it from the proceedings. The original resolution and plan read as follows :

"That the Congress will apply to His Majesty for a redress of grievances under which his faithful subjects in America labour ; and assure him that the Colonies hold in

abhorrence the idea of being considered independent communities of the British Government, and most ardently desire the establishment of a political union, not only among themselves, but with the Mother State, upon those principles of safety and freedom which are essential in the constitution of all free governments, and peculiarly that of the British Legislature ; and as the Colonies, from their local circumstances, cannot be represented in the Parliament of Great Britain, they will humbly propose to His Majesty and his two Houses of Parliament the following plan, under which the strength of the whole Empire may be drawn together on an emergency, the interest of both countries advanced, and the rights and liberties of America secured :

“ ‘ A PLAN OF A PROPOSED UNION BETWEEN
GREAT BRITAIN AND THE COLONIES.

“ ‘ That a British and American Legislature, for regulating the administration of the general affairs of America, be proposed and established in America, including all the said Colonies ; within, and under the which Government, each Colony shall retain its present constitution, and powers of regulating and governing its own internal police, in all cases whatever.

“ ‘That the said Government shall be administered by a President-General, to be appointed by the King, and a Grand Council, to be chosen by the Representatives of the people of the several Colonies, in their respective Assemblies, once in every three years.

“ ‘That the several Assemblies shall choose members for the Grand Council in the following proportions, viz.:

New Hampshire,	Delaware Counties,
Massachusetts-Bay,	Maryland,
Rhode-Island,	Virginia,
Connecticut,	North-Carolina,
New York,	South-Carolina,
New Jersey,	and
Pennsylvania,	Georgia;

“ ‘who shall meet at the city of . . . for the first time, being called by the President-General as soon as conveniently may be after his appointment.

“ ‘That there shall be a new election of members for the Grand Council every three years; and on the death, removal, or resignation of any member, his place shall be supplied by a new choice at the next meeting of the Assembly of the Colony he represented.

“ ‘That the Grand Council shall meet once in every year, if they shall think it necessary, and oftener if occasions shall require, at such time and place as they shall adjourn to at the

last preceding meeting, or as they shall be called to meet at, by the President-General on any emergency.

“ ‘ That the Grand Council shall have power to choose their speaker, and shall hold and exercise all the like rights, liberties, and privileges, as are held and exercised by and in the House of Commons of Great Britain.

“ ‘ That the President-General shall hold his office during the pleasure of the King, and his assent shall be required to all acts of the Grand Council, and it shall be his office and duty to cause them to be carried into execution.

“ ‘ That the President-General, by and with the advice and consent of the Grand Council, shall hold and exercise all the legislative rights, powers, and authorities necessary for regulating and administering all the general police and affairs of the Colonies in which Great Britain and the Colonies, or any of them, the Colonies in general, or more than one Colony, are in any manner concerned, as well civil and criminal as commercial.

“ ‘ *That the said President-General and Grand Council shall be an inferior and distinct branch of the British Legislature, united and incorporated with it for the aforesaid general purposes, and that any of the said regulations may originate, and be formed and digested, either in the Parliament of Great Britain, or in the said General Council, and being*

*prepared, transmitted to the other for their approbation or dissent ; and the assent of both shall be required for the validity of all such general acts or statutes.*¹

“ ‘ That in time of war all Bills for granting aids to the Crown, prepared by the Grand Council, and approved by the President-General, shall be valid, and passed into law, without the assent of the British Parliament.’ ”

Such was the plan, and of it Galloway himself said : “ I shall not affirm that this plan is formed upon the most perfect principles of policy and government ; but, as it is a universally prevailing opinion that the Colonies cannot be represented in Parliament, I know of no other which comes so near to them ; and it is most evident, upon a due consideration of it, that the rights of America would have been fully restored, and her freedom effectually secured by it. For under it no law can be binding on America to which the people, by their representatives, have not previously given their consent : this is the essence of liberty, and what more could her people desire ? ”

His proposed division of powers is interest-

¹ The italics are not Galloway's.

ing. The general interests of the Colonies, which were to be the subject of the deliberations and decisions of the Grand Council, he enumerated as follows : " Laws for granting aids to the Crown, levying taxes in just and reasonable proportions on the Colonies, and for regulating a general paper currency, which ought, in all good policy, to be established on funds equally solid and ascertained at the same value ; and laws for settling disputes between the Colonies respecting their boundaries—with a variety of other matters that must arise naturally from the jarring interests of the Colonies, which will continually increase with the increase of their wealth and commerce." Galloway seems obsessed by the idea that the Colonies were eternally divided by essentially conflicting interests.

The plan, naturally, was attacked for restricting the powers of the various colonial legislatures ; but here he found his assailants at a great disadvantage. They presupposed colonial independence, if they meant their criticism to be serious, and not a mere base appeal to the selfish interests of the representatives then sitting in the colonial assemblies ; but this presupposition they could, as yet, maintain only in secret. Galloway,

therefore, was able to reply with the self-assurance of truth: "Far from diminishing the rights of colonial legislatures, it extended them by giving each a new jurisdiction to decide upon regulations which relate to the general affairs of the Colonies."

Despite his very singular error about clashing colonial interests, Galloway's scheme was quite logical and sound. It was necessary that the Colonies be taxed in some manner, in order to support that Government which protected them and managed their common interests. Parliament had attempted it, only to meet defiance. Although the Sovereign personally was very largely responsible for the trouble, the Crown politically, through the happy character of the British Constitution, remained above the strife, and continued uninfluenced by it. A representative power was wanted in America to work under the Crown, whose honour was unsullied, and perform the functions which in England were fulfilled by the Parliament working under the King, for he was the essential bond of union, and not Parliament. Therefore, why not establish in America an authority co-ordinate with the British Parliament? The inexperience, however, of the younger branch of the Legis-

lature could be supplemented by the wisdom of the elder, by allowing the latter to institute measures for the former, while a judicious check upon the younger could be administered by the cooler counsels of the elder branch.

In the following year another plan¹ appeared which carried still further Galloway's idea of an American Parliament. The American desire for independence could no longer be ignored. This plan included provision for a genuine American Parliament. In two particulars it was a distinct advance beyond Galloway's proposal. It was a double-chambered Legislature, and in all American affairs was co-ordinate with the British Parliament to as full an extent as the various Colonial Parliaments of the present day. It differed, however, from its modern parallels, in being elected by the various local Assemblies instead of by the people directly.

Propositions for the Present Peace, etc., 1775.

The first move toward the achievement of this plan was to be made during the winter suspension of hostilities. The author proposed that "the Governors of the Colonies be directed to call the Assemblies of each province together, and to acquaint them with His

¹ *Propositions for the Present Peace and Future Government of the Colonies.* London, 1775.

Majesty's gracious intentions of affording them a legal opportunity of manifesting the sincerity of their desires of a speedy reconciliation with *Great Britain*—by each assembly choosing a certain number of deputies (suppose)—four members of the Council, and twelve of the representatives of each province to meet at New York or Philadelphia, and form an assembly of deputies." Galloway had included representatives only from the Assemblies, not from the Councils.

A Lord-Lieutenant was to represent the Crown as the head of the Government, after the fashion of Galloway's President-General. The second article of these "Propositions" provided that "if the majority of the said deputies shall request His Majesty to appoint a Lord-Lieutenant for America, that His Majesty will make such an appointment, to take place with all convenient speed after their petition shall be presented, empowering the said Lord-Lieutenant to concur with the deputies of his provinces in such wise, just, and salutary measures, as may be thought most expedient for settling the present peace of America and its future tranquillity."

Article five prescribed a yearly election of

these deputies from the provincial councils and representative assemblies. They were to assemble at such time and place as the Lord-Lieutenant should appoint. He was to "preside in the same manner as His Majesty's Governor doth over the assembly of each province." The acts of this Government were to bind the individual provinces. But first they had to receive the Lord-Lieutenant's approval, and then be transmitted home for the Royal assent. The authority of this Parliament was to be limited to powers of taxation and to the apportionment of the militia to be raised either in peace or for war. In all other respects each province was to retain that form of government to which it had been accustomed. The whole was designed to be an American counterpart of the English Constitution, the King appearing in the Lord-Lieutenant, the House of Commons in the combined representatives of the provincial assemblies, and the House of Lords in the deputies from the various councils.

In the next year, 1776, still another proposal¹ of an American Parliament was

Observations on the Reconciliation, etc.,

¹ *Observations on the Reconciliation of Great Britain and the Colonies*, by a Friend of American Liberty. Philadelphia, 1776.

1776.

published, this time at Philadelphia. Across the page of the American Constitution is written in large letters the fear of a great central power, due, of course, to the abuse of that power which precipitated the birth of the great Western Republic. Thus, it is not surprising that this plan, written by an American in the year of the Declaration of Independence, should be stamped similarly with the pressure of that fear. In some places it appears as humorous now as it was serious then.

The fifth of the Articles of Compact set forth in the *Observations on the Reconciliation of Great Britain and the Colonies* runs as follows: "As it is necessary that there should be some general power to superintend and regulate the interest of the Colonies as connected with and interfering with each other, which no provincial legislature is competent to; and as it would be dangerous to give the British Parliament that power lest tyranny might enter in at so indefinite a passage, there should be a general Convention consisting of the deputies from the several Colony assemblies, or from the people, whose business should be to regulate the posts, the general currency, and the prepara-

tion of the forces of the Colonies, and all other matters in which the separate colony legislatures have not sufficient authority, and which are not contrary to the right herein allowed to the British Parliament. One special business of this Convention should be to keep a vigilant and careful watch over the designs and transactions of the British Ministry and Parliament, that, by an early watchword, it may prevent tyranny in its embryo. But as absolute power might in time be assumed by this Congress, were it without any check, its Acts, therefore, should go home for the Royal assent ; the Crown to have no power to reject them, or the Provincial Acts, unless done within three years after passing here."

The sixth Article provides that, " For our security against the introduction of British troops to enslave us in times of tranquillity, when we have forgot the use of arms, a perpetual standing militia bill should form part of the compact, by which means the people of the Colonies would keep up their martial spirit, and always be prepared against the attack of arbitrary power." As a safeguard against sudden foreign invasion, however, there was to be a force of 10,000 or

12,000 British troops always on the American Continent.

The author of this plan was much more possessed by this fear of power than by anything else. He did say that there should be a new election every two years, but nowhere did he suggest a head for this Government to supply the place of the President-General or Lord-Lieutenant. He touched, however, upon the matter of trade, a subject which the others did not consider. In his eighth Article he said: "As these Colonies would be protected by the power of Britain, and would receive all the duties arising from the regulation of trade, the Colonies should stipulate to allow them 8 per cent. upon all merchandise imported from foreign countries. . . . If the exigencies of the State should at any time require a further grant, the same should be obtained freely by way of requisition."

CHAPTER V

OTHER PROPOSALS

IMPERIAL representation and an American Parliament were the only two solutions which gained any general acceptance. Though there were several other proposals, they, for the most part, were advanced individually, and had little influence upon public opinion. Despite the fact that they were never very popular and so never very feasible, they still possess considerable interest.

Of the three minor plans—a permanent conciliation board, commercial assimilation, and a Pan-British League—the first¹ is of the least importance. Its chief function was to arbitrate upon the apportionment of taxation between Britain and America. “If from the variable state of things,” it ran, “especially amongst colonies not yet attained to complete establishment, proper proportions

¹ *Some Candid Suggestions towards Accommodation of Differences with America.* London, 1775.

cannot presently be fixed for perpetuity ; suppose a fixed number of delegates from each province in America, chosen by (their) respective assemblies, meet each few number of years, a fixed number of Peers and Commons, chosen by (the) respective Houses of Parliament in London, to establish (the) respective proportions of taxes, and other burthens of sailors and soldiers, etc., and for other regulations which affect the whole family, reserving to each assembly what regulations, taxes, etc., are peculiar to each ; and that each assembly, as best acquainted with peculiar circumstances, fix the number and persons of levying the money and men, etc., with certain means to make the quotas effectual, and clear remedies in case of deficiency ; the meeting at London is but a small and reasonable preference and compliment to the acknowledged parent."

Justice and protection were to be the undisputed spheres of the central government. "There should be no provincial laws incompatible with England : juries should operate universally, as in England. The King, acknowledged by the Colonies as their sovereign, should name (the) Governors and Council, and all supreme Judges, the last to be for life ;

each province to pay to all of them fixed salaries, according to (their) present abilities, to be varied at proposed periods, as (the) proportions of (the) burdens may be varied. All inferior magistrates, as Sheriffs, Justices, etc., to be named as in Britain and Ireland; if any of the Colonies judge necessary to levy forces for sea or land, for their own security, against any enemies, native or foreign, (they are) to be paid from (the) common stock, as (the) safety of each is (the) benefit of all."

There was more wisdom in the object of this proposal than in the means adopted to secure it. Not only would this joint Council divide the burden of the revenue between England and America, but as there was no other competent body, it would have to adjust between the different Colonies the amount of taxes to be borne by each. This latter duty would cause trouble. Even if the various Colonies were represented there in a proportion somewhat corresponding to their share of the common expense, which would be difficult, there would still remain the objection that Englishmen, who had no interest whatever, possessed a right to share in the intercolonial apportionment

of taxes. Moreover, some scheme was wanted to compose the quarrel between England and America; but this plan, far from achieving that high end, would have brought face to face at stated periods the opposing interests of the two peoples. Finally, the very nature of an arbitration board is negative. It is designed for the settling of occasional disputes as they arise. What was required was something utterly different—a great positive force which would unite and guide the two halves of the Empire in perpetual harmony.

Commer-
cial Incor-
poration.

A shrewder suggestion, however, was thrown out by the same author—that of commercial preference and commercial unity. The idea was in the air. On this subject another pamphleteer,¹ a man who had already advocated colonial representation, remarked that the political bond in every State should be mutual utility. But the proposal was never altogether clearly formulated as a policy by itself, it was almost always more or less mixed up and confused with other issues. Identity of commercial interests was hardly ever dissociated from equality of taxa-

¹ *A Plan of Reunion between Great Britain and her Colonies.* London, 1778. Cf. p. 49 *et seq.*

tion and a general extension of equal rights and duties.

The author of *Some Candid Suggestions* not only proposed a periodical arbitration committee, he also possessed a clear idea of a commercial union. He would have removed, or partially removed, all interior commercial barriers separating the several parts of the Empire, shutting out, at the same time, all foreign merchandise as far as would be politic. He advocated placing the exchange of goods within the Empire upon a basis "cheaper or more free of public burthens than to foreigners." His chief object was "to secure preference to (the) reciprocal goods of any of the family, Ireland included with Britain." "Reciprocal premiums and encouragements for improvements for the general good," he urged, "should be made by each member, and all should avoid as much as possible such as may interfere with, or hurt each other." He aimed at making the Empire self-sufficient economically.

Special attention, he said, should be given to "peculiar encouragements for (the) improvements of articles which may rescue any of the family from foreign dependence for

necessaries, or even luxuries ; such as naval stores, or necessaries for the parent country, as rough materials of manufactures, as silk, cotton, flax, hemp, dyes, etc., and especially wool from a brood of Spanish sheep,¹ if it will do in America, now threatened to be prohibited exportation from Spain ; also ashes of all sorts for bleaching, etc., for which vast sums go yearly from Great Britain and Ireland to foreigners, though American ashes are stronger and cheaper ; and Americans may easily learn the process of pearl ashes, now got chiefly, almost wholly from Hungary." By such arrangements British money would "only go to our own Colonies, to their great profit and ours." Besides these necessaries he enumerated several luxuries that should be encouraged : " Wines, fruits, spices, perhaps tea in time, since many nations will have it ; and various minerals, drugs, etc., for all which America is especially capable, and should be largely aided, even specially by the parent country. By such means all their lands and hands might have full employ, without injury to (the) parent country."²

Though seldom clearly formulated, the idea

¹ Merino.

² *Some Candid Suggestions.* 1775.

was always present, and when the College of Philadelphia offered a prize for a dissertation upon the advantages of a perpetual union between Great Britain and her American Colonies, the arguments thus evoked turned chiefly on the identity of commercial interests. "It is impolitic," wrote one successful candidate, "to import American commodities from other nations."¹ England could secure "raw silk from Georgia, hemp for cordage, iron for various arts, a great abundance of naval stores of all kinds from Pennsylvania, Carolina, New Jersey, New York, and New England, as planks, timber, masts, yards, and all materials for shipbuilding." Another candidate² said: "Here we may trace the great utility of the Colonies, not only that they afford a constant and sure supply of the subjects of commerce, necessary for the support of the power and manufactures of the Mother Country, but in that she has an indisputable exclusive preference in the sale of them, and the Colonies in return are the fixed and constant customers for all her manufactures and commodities,

¹ *Dissertation on the Advantages of a Perpetual Union between Great Britain and her American Colonies.* Philadelphia, John Morgan, 1766.

² *Ibid.*, Stephen Watts.

to which they are indispensably obliged to give the preference over those of other countries."

It was simply the old colonial system reviewed and revised in the light of Scottish experience. Though they remarked the new prosperity of the Northern Kingdom, they did not pause to distinguish whether it was due to commercial incorporation, or the extension of equal privileges and duties, or to both these causes. Hence it is these two ideas were confused in colonial affairs; though they were usually advanced together, sometimes one was emphasized, sometimes the other.

The author of *A Plan of Reunion* was greatly attracted by the idea of a uniform extension of rights and privileges over the Empire. "Consider," he said, "the Empire as a whole, . . . extend the privileges and taxes of the Mother Country over the whole Empire alike. . . . England has more than doubled the exertion of her strength, by the incorporation of Scotland; how much more would her energy increase, were Ireland and the Colonies adopted into one equal system of laws and commerce?"

This "incorporation or communication of

privileges and rights" he considered to be even more efficacious than colonial representation. "We have not repeated," he continues, "what we have already proposed concerning the admission of American representatives into Parliament ;¹ because, though such a measure would no doubt fall in with the common prejudices respecting representation, and might in itself be a proper and just measure, though we think the measure highly practicable, and the present the season for enacting it, yet in the plan which we have proposed for the good of the Colonies, by the impartial extensions of privileges and burdens, it is in no respect necessary for the purposes of freedom or security, while our Legislature already contains an essential branch taken for a period from and returning after a period again into the mass of the people." Not content with the Scottish example, he turned to classic times. "It was the absurd reluctance which the Athenians had, even to communicate to individuals the rights of citizenship, which made their once splendid maritime Empire of so short a duration. It was the readiness with which the Romans

¹ Cf. p: 50.

incorporated their conquests that gave stability, extension, and strength to their sovereignty."¹

One might be permitted, perhaps, to suspect that a few gentlemen who made such proposals were not quite clear about the subject they were discussing. General principles are excellent, but sometimes they evaporate in very vague utterances. If instead of comparing the Athenian and the Roman Empires, and instead of preferring an equal extension of rights and duties to parliamentary representation, they had descended from the clouds of their general language, and formulated some definite scheme whereby the extension of these rights and privileges, carefully enumerated, could be achieved practically, they would have better established their claim to political wisdom.

*American
Indepen-
dence,*
1775.

Perhaps the most curious proposal of all appeared in 1775. The book² contained a reprint of a series of twelve letters, a letter to Edmund Burke, a plan or sketch of an Act of Parliament, and an explanation. The title, *American Independence*, is some-

¹ Cf. p. 46.

² *American Independence the Interest and Glory of Great Britain.* London, 1775.

what startling to one searching for a scheme of closer Imperial union. At the first glance, the author seems guilty of the stupendous anomaly of advocating American Independence as the best means of uniting the Empire. Breaking it asunder is hardly the most obvious way of binding it together.

A Pan-British League.

Upon closer examination, however, the plan resembles those which provided for an American Parliament, in that it recognized the supreme sovereignty of the Crown along with American independence of Parliament. But it differed from them in setting up instead a Grand British League and Alliance of all British States. "I would consider the American Governments," said he, "like that of Ireland, as sister kingdoms; and I would cement a lasting union with them as between the separate branches of one great family."

The apparent anomaly seems very strong in the following passage: "By making them independent of our will and pleasure, we shall render them effectually dependent upon our influence." But the incongruity is soon explained away: "By means of a parliamentary declaration of their independency and a *national league with them*, we may, but by no other means can, effectu-

ally promote and secure on a right basis the mutual prosperity of both countries." All were to remain as they had been under the same Crown. Under its presidency the new league was to be formed.

For all this, the draught of the proposed Act of Parliament made careful arrangement. Enumerating the various Colonies, it provided for their recognition as "free and independent States, owing no obedience . . . whatever to the Parliament of Great Britain, which doth hereby . . . relinquish all claims and pretences of sovereignty . . . and controlling power." The British Crown in its new office was to be assisted by the British Parliament. "Of each and every of the said free and independent States, His Majesty is and shall be held to be the true and lawful sovereign head, and in the said sovereignty, and the just exercise of the powers thereto belonging, shall be maintained and supported by the whole power of the Parliament and people of Great Britain. . . . The Parliament of Great Britain will be the guardian and protector of all and every of the said free and independent States collectively and individually, against every foreign power whatsoever."

The curious plan was to be instituted by each of these "free and independent States" sending to England . . . "one plenipotentiary delegate, duly commissioned and authorized to attend the Parliament at Westminster . . . to express . . . their hearty . . . acceptance of this . . . guaranteed independence and protection . . . and make a full acknowledgment . . . of sovereignty and dominion claimed by the Crown of Great Britain, in and over the seas, lakes, and great rivers of North America . . . to enter into a solemn perpetual and joint confederation, or general grand league and alliance, offensive and defensive, for maintaining entire and in its full force that cordial and warm affection which hath hitherto so closely bound together and united Great Britain and British America ; and which in consideration of the near and strong ties of kindred, of the community of laws, language, manners, and religion ; . . . of their commercial interests, . . . their connection as protectors and protected, ought for ever, most sacredly and inviolably, to be preserved between them, in preference to any other political connection, alliance, confederacy, treaty, or engagement, whatsoever."

Even the dignity of the obstinate King was to be preserved: "His Majesty will be a gainer, inasmuch as he will thereby receive fifteen independent kingdoms in exchange for as many dependent, and hardly dependent provinces."¹

It was scarcely a German confederacy with England instead of Prussia at the head, but yet it was much more than an Imperial version of the American Monroe doctrine. In his enumeration of the States to be declared independent of the English Parliament it is surprising to find that he included even Quebec, Nova Scotia, and St. John's Island. Though this proposal was published in London, it is suggestive of that strong desire to possess Canada which has characterized the United States from the very beginning, long before the revolt. But the author was most likely only trying to preserve the symmetry of his plan.

Strangely enough, this scheme, which, on the face of it seems to favour independence and the disruption of the Empire, in its division of powers, withholds from the local legislatures wide spheres of jurisdiction, and reserves a great community of interests

¹ Letter x.

to be guarded by the central authority.¹ The currency, of course, was to be common—a condition that does not exist in the Empire to-day. “It might perhaps be right to establish the use of British money only, as the lawful current coin throughout British America, with a condition that each State should send in its proportion of bullion to the Mint, or grant Great Britain an equivalent for the use of her money.” The Colonies were to have a very weak central government, and even this was to be called under British supervision. “It might perhaps be proper and necessary for some small central island, or district, lying on the Atlantic Sea, to be ceded to Great Britain for the residence of the British Ambassador-General and Plenipotentiary to the said States. . . . Would it not be reasonable for the British-American States, as, in a manner, the political wards of Great Britain, and relying wholly on her for external protection, totally to incapacitate themselves for entering into any treaties or alliances with any foreign powers whatsoever? Might it not be eligible to admit of and join in constituting a general Continental congress

¹ Letter x., letter xii., letter to Burke, and draft plan.

to which each State should send one delegate, and which should never assemble but on the summons of the British Ambassador-General? The business of this Congress to be treaty and not government, and only to deliberate on peace and war, and such other occasional matters as might be of general concernment."

Admiralty jurisdiction was to be entirely under British control. The residence of the Ambassador-General was to be also that of the Admiral. It would be the headquarters, he said, of the latter for "establishing a British Court of Admiralty for the more convenient dispatch of naval business upon the spot ; and for other purposes of a like nature, appertaining to the naval dominion and umpireship of the Crown of Great Britain." There was also to be a well-situated post upon the lakes for the same purpose. This jurisdiction was even to invade the individual States. "For the ease and convenience of the respective States, they might permit subordinate courts of Admiralty to be held by Great Britain, under due restrictions, in such of their seaport towns along the coast as might be convenient." The Navy was also to be a bond of union : "As it would be impossible to prevent an indiscriminate mixture of British

and of British-American seamen in the ships of either country, so it might be proper for the said States to consent that seamen for the Royal Navy should be raised promiscuously from amongst the mariners of both, according to the present custom of the service." Only temporary fortifications were to be allowed, and, for the erection of such, war alone was to be a sufficient justification. They were to be under the British flag. In time of war against any maritime power, these Colonies or States were to "contribute subsidies in such proportions to their ability as should be regulated in a general Congress, the whole bearing an established proportion to the extraordinary expenses of Great Britain, as originally settled in forming the Grand British League and Confederacy."

Of the early proposals this was almost alone in including provisions for the extension of the Empire. They are interesting. "No interruption should be given to the growing of such new States . . . but that until the settlers within any such partitioned tract¹ of the wilderness should be

¹ He divided the uninhabited regions geographically into nineteen districts, which might become States according to this plan

increased and multiply to the number of fifty thousand souls, they should be considered as incapable of forming an independent State, and be subject for the intermediate time to the Government of Great Britain. But as soon as their numbers should amount to fifty thousand souls as aforesaid, they should be entitled and free to erect themselves into an independent political State, and to constitute for their own Governments a legislative power as they should judge most proper, provided that they acknowledged the King of Great Britain as their lawful sovereign; that they made the Protestant faith the established religion of the country; and consented to become a party to the Grand British League and Confederacy."

There were two fundamental errors in this scheme, which would have prevented it being taken seriously, or at least regarded as anything but a temporary expedient that must soon lose its value. In the first place Great Britain was to bear the whole burden of the peace establishment of the Empire. Though concord between the two countries would enable England's commerce to flourish, so that she might bear the extra burden, for, said he, "Great Britain is not a conquering,

but a commercial State"; still the American Colonies would also gain from the same cause and the injustice would not be removed. Secondly, he ignored the great common interests of the American Colonies, and so his plan did not provide for a strong central American Government, but left the Colonies weak and divided, the literal wards of Great Britain.

This completes the number of Imperial proposals of the eighteenth century. Conclu-
sion. Representation, an American Parliament, commercial union, a permanent arbitration board, and a Pan-British League, were all advanced; but nowhere, not even in the last plan, was the principle of federation applied to the solution of the Imperial problem. Though, at the first glance, this may seem strange, yet it is easily explained. This idea, which dominates the Imperialism of the nineteenth century, was entirely absent from the eighteenth-century movement, because of two great intervening changes :

1. Though as old as the Achæan League, the principle of federation was languishing in Europe. There were no outstanding examples of its application until it was revived in the American Constitution. Meanwhile

the idea of liberty, which had been fermenting in French philosophical writings, was consecrated and desecrated by the Revolution. Men began to realize that liberty could be best secured under a system of federation, and this idea grew with the prosperity of the United States, where the greatest federal experiment in the history of the world was in operation.

2. The great development of the Empire rendered inevitable the concession of responsible self-government to the Colonies. This, together with the growth of the individual Colonies to such a size that they might claim to be regarded as equal members of the Empire rather than distant appendages, seemed to prepare the way for federation.

PERIOD II

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

CHAPTER VI

THE REBIRTH OF IMPERIALISM

THE success of the American Revolution put an end to the first period of the Imperial movement. The rebirth of Imperialism was delayed by an unfortunate train of events which distracted England's attention from her Colonies until they had to be given responsible government, and then by responsible government becoming the badge of potential independence.

The revival of the Imperial idea came in the form of a reaction against this belief in the inevitable trend towards independence. The first suggestion of Imperial union in the nineteenth century was provoked by the argument that a federated British North America might desire independence.

J. B.
Robinson,
1822.

John Beverley Robinson,¹ writing in 1822 to Horton, the Under-Secretary of State, to refute this statement, said that the surest way to bind the Colonies to the Mother Country was not by restricting their freedom ; "a security far nobler " and stronger would be found "by allowing the Parliament of the United Provinces² to be represented in the British Parliament by one or two members who should have power to propose and discuss measures, but not to vote, or to vote only on matters immediately affecting the Colonies." In fact, said he, the system might be extended to the whole Empire. It would not be difficult "to group the colonial possessions of the Empire into six or seven confederacies according to their situations, and to allow to each of these confederacies a representative in Parliament. This actual consolidation of the British Empire would at least be a grand measure of national policy, and, by allowing to the inhabitants of the most remote regions of the Crown an opportunity of making known their wants, their interests, and their dangers, in the Great

¹ Egerton and Grant, *Canadian Constitutional Development*, p. 147.

² Of America.

Council of the Nation, it would make them feel themselves as parts rather than as dependencies of the Empire ; it would mitigate the irritation of colonial dissensions, and would make perfect and general through the Empire that knowledge of the situation and circumstances of the Colonies which, it must be confessed, is at present incomplete and confined to few." Robinson there struck the keynote of the Imperial movement of the nineteenth century. Through all the proposals of the last hundred years runs the one fundamental idea which he expressed so concisely : *It would make them feel themselves as parts rather than as dependencies of the Empire.*

In 1831, during the discussion of the Reform Bill, Joseph Hume proposed colonial representation in the British House. That it was not the Imperial idea, but the Reform idea, which was moving in his mind, is quite certain. Hume's views upon economy led him to inveigh very frequently against the expense of the Colonies. The two ideas of Reform and Empire were more often opposed than confused.

The next suggestion of Imperial union, likewise a revolt against the idea of independence, was, like Robinson's, inspired by

R. Lowe,
1844.

the hope that the Colonies would become integral parts instead of mere appendages of the Empire. In the New South Wales Correspondence in the Record Office, there is a report of a debate in the Legislative Council at Sydney, August 20, 1844. In this first Australian Legislature—then only one year old—Mr. Robert Lowe, afterwards Lord Sherbrooke, in a speech on the subject of the separation of the present Colony of Victoria, said he “cordially agreed with the abstract truth of the motto prefixed to the article in the newspaper that morning, that ‘Union is Strength,’ and he would extend the principle to the whole Colonial Empire of Great Britain. He hoped and believed that the time was not remote when Great Britain would give up the idea of treating the dependencies of the Crown as children, who were to be cast adrift by their parent as soon as they arrived at manhood, and substitute for it the far wiser and nobler policy of knitting herself and her Colonies into one mighty Confederacy, girdling the earth with its whole circumference, and confident against the world in arts and arms.”¹

¹ Quoted in Labillière, *British Federalism: Rise and Progress*. London, 1893.

The Imperial sentiment soon gathered strength. Five years later, J. R. Godley, J. R. Godley, 1849. an eminent early New Zealand colonist, also combated the idea of separation. Writing to Gladstone, just before leaving Plymouth, he said: "The best argument against separation is to be found in the strength and prevalence of a moral instinct which separatists do not recognize, and which they hardly understand, though they bear a strong testimony to its truth in the remarkable reluctance which they manifest to avow their doctrines. . . . I maintain that the love of Empire, properly understood—*i.e.*, the instinct of self-development and expansion—is an unfailing symptom of lusty and vigorous life in a people; and that, subject to the conditions of justice and humanity, it is not only legitimate but most laudable. Certain am I that the decline of such a feeling is always the result, not of matured wisdom or enlarged philanthropy, but of luxurious imbecility and selfish sloth . . . it is unquestionable, notwithstanding the disgraceful circumstances under which America was torn from the grasp of England, we suffered less in prestige and strength by that obstinate and disastrous struggle than if, like the soft Triumvir, we

had 'lost a world and had been content to lose it.' Depend upon it, the instinct of national pride is sound and true."¹ This sounds very much like what Labillière said in 1869 at the Bristol Congress: "Union of the Empire is a sentiment, or rather a sacred principle, in devoted loyalty to which we should all vie with each other."²

Godley, three years later, December 1, 1852, in a lecture delivered in New Zealand, spoke of "the questions it would be right and proper to reserve from colonial jurisdiction, and place under the exclusive cognizance of the Imperial Government." These he enumerated in the words of Mr. Adderley, afterwards Lord Norton: "First, allegiance of the Colonies to Her Majesty's Crown; second, naturalization of aliens; third, whatever relates to treaties between the Crown and any foreign Power; fourth, all political intercourse and communications between any of the Colonies and any officer of a foreign Power; fifth, whatever relates to the employment, command, and discipline of Her Majesty's troops and ships within the

¹ Labillière, *British Federalism: Rise and Progress*.

² Labillière, *Future Relations of England and her Colonies*. London, 1869.

Colonies, and whatever relates to the defence of the Colonies against foreign aggression, including the command of the colonial militia and marine in time of war; sixth, whatever relates to the crime of high treason.”¹ He did not hesitate to proceed to the logical conclusion of this reservation of powers and declare for Imperial Federation. “Before the time arrives when those Colonies, conscious of power, shall demand the privileges of standing on equal terms with the Mother Country in the family of nations, I trust that increased facility of intercourse may render it practicable to establish an Imperial Congress for the British Empire, in which all its members may be fairly represented, and which may administer the affairs which are common to all.”²

About the same time Joseph Howe, the prominent Nova Scotian, was also advocating Imperial union. In 1854 he delivered a very strong speech urging Imperial Organization and Defence. It was published in London, with another pamphlet, *The Organization of the Empire*, in 1866.

¹ Labillière, *British Federalism : Rise and Progress*.

² *Ibid.*

His speech had a very hearty ring. "The statesmen of England, sir, may be assured, that if they would hold this great Empire together, they must give the outlying portions of it some interest in the Naval, Military, and Civil Services, and I will co-operate with any man who will impress upon them the necessity for lengthening the ropes and strengthening the stakes, that the fabric which shelters us may not tumble about our ears. I have often thought, sir, how powerful this Empire might be made; how prosperous in peace, how invincible in war, if England would but set about its organization, and draw to a common centre the high intellects which it contains." In his pamphlet¹ he made the proposal "to treat all the Colonies which have Legislatures, and where the system of responsible government is in operation, as having achieved a higher political status than Crown Colonies or foreign dependencies, and to permit them to send to the House of Commons one, two, or three members of their Cabinets, according to their size, population, and relative importance." This he urged as the best

¹ J. Howe, *The Organization of the Empire*. London, 1866.

plan, because it would not only obviate the difficulty of franchise, but would provide the best men, men who authoritatively represented the majority of each Colony, men who had been trained for the British Parliament in a similar school. This done, two Bills, he said, should be passed, one to provide for the defence of the Empire to operate uniformly throughout its extent, and another to raise the necessary funds. Of the many means possible, Howe favoured a tax on imports. Like all other Imperial measures, he would have had these submitted to the sanction of the Colonial Governments and Legislatures.

The "General Association for the Australian Colonies," which existed in London, 1855-1862, to harmonize the relations between Australia and the Mother Country, also faced the problem. In 1857 a special meeting of the Association considered a motion which, however, was withdrawn after some discussion. It ran as follows: "That a memorial be presented by the Association to the Secretary of State for Colonies, requesting that he will be pleased, in the Cabinet deliberations on the forthcoming Reform Bill, to represent to Her Majesty's Ministers the strong claims of

Australian
Associa-
tion, 1857.

the Colonies to some share of representation in the Imperial Legislature, but that it be at the same time expressed to Mr. Labouchère that, in the opinion of this Association, the Colonies do not accept of parliamentary representation unless their present rights of self-taxation be continued and preserved to them inviolate."¹

Colonial
origin.

All these suggestions had a colonial origin. Nor is this surprising. Some years later² S. W. Kelsey remarked that in the colonial affection for the Mother Country was to be found "the strongest proof that national feeling is intensified rather than diminished when Englishmen are located at the extremities of the Empire." It was exactly the same thirty years before he wrote. This was the fulfilment of the prophecy made by John Beverley Robinson in 1822. The Colonies, by receiving responsible government at the hands of the Mother Country, were thereby more closely bound to her. Englishmen, on the other hand, had grown accustomed to the colonial cry for responsible government, and had become so familiar with the idea of granting it in an ever fuller degree, that they

¹ Labillière, *British Federalism : Rise and Progress*. London, 1893.

² In 1884. *Imperial Federation*. London, 1903.

regarded disintegration as the inevitable future of the Empire. Thus the revival of the Imperial idea was not only a reaction against the cry of independence, but it proceeded first, not from the Mother Country, but from the Colonies.

As early as 1853 in England, however, the idea was proposed by Rev. William Arthur. Rev. Wm.
Arthur,
1853. "The idea," said he, "that this Empire can permanently be conserved by merely giving Constitutions to our Colonies is not to be entertained. That is right in itself . . . but its time will expire. . . . Let us recognize the fact that, by growth and accessions, we are an Empire comprising many States. Let us lay down the organic laws of this Empire, which no legislature, either of the Parent State or any other, may infringe ; let us add to our legislative chambers an Imperial Senate, without the concurrence of which no measures affecting Imperial questions can pass ; let each existing Colony, on reaching a certain point of population or revenue, be eligible to become, on its own application, a State and a member of the Imperial Federation, bound by the organic laws, and sending to the Imperial Senate its representatives in such proportion as shall be fixed ; let it, on all pro-

vincial or internal questions, . . . be entirely free, bound, in fact, only by the organic laws, and, in Imperial questions, subject to the Imperial Legislature."¹

About this time the Crimean War broke out, and the regiment Canada raised, together with Australia's large subscriptions to the Patriotic and Indian Relief Fund, also contributed to stimulate Imperial feeling.²

Anti-Imperialist feeling.

But Wm. Arthur was a voice crying in the wilderness. The Imperial idea was ridiculed by Goldwin Smith in his letters to the *Daily News* and, a little later, in his book, *The Empire*, in which he discussed it merely in the light of "how to get rid of it." The great cost of the Empire gave a handle to its adversaries. Cobden, Roebuck and Molesworth, and even a strong Imperialist, bewailed the enormous and increasing burdens entailed by the Colonies. It was pointed out that wherever representative governments prevailed, the Colonies had reduced Imperial expenses and raised local militias. Self-defence seemed the corollary of self-government.³ Self-government still meant incipient independence.

¹ *Quarterly Review*. London, December, 1853.

² Labillière, *Future Relations of England and her Colonies*. London, 1869.

³ *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. xi., chap. xxvii.

About the end of the sixties the tide ^{Reaction.} against Imperialism received a great check. There was much anxiety abroad in England because it was generally understood that several members of the Liberal party earnestly desired to detach the Colonies from the Mother Country. Denials were returned to accusations, and the whole matter was aired in Parliament.¹ This "openly disgraceful policy" soon evoked opposition which grew with cries of "United Empire."² The Royal Colonial Institute, which was founded in 1868 with this as its motto, contributed largely, by its meetings, to the revival of Imperial feeling. The reaction against the separatist policy was led by Edward Wilson, James Youl, and several other well-known men. "Assembling together, they sounded the tocsin of alarm at the spread of these pernicious ideas and narrow views, and boldly appealed to all who felt as they did to make an emphatic protest against them. It was thus that the memorable meetings, which were held in the heart of the city of London, at the Cannon Street Hotel, in the year 1869, became the signal

Royal
Colonial
Institute,
1868.

¹ Sir Julius Vogel, *Nineteenth Century*, July, 1877.

² Labillière, *British Federalism: Rise and Progress*. London, 1893.

for the turning of the tide.”¹ These meetings, which lasted five or six weeks, saw two resolutions passed, one on the value of the Colonies, and the other on the value to the Colonies of the Imperial connection.²

About the same time the Social Science Congress met at Bristol. It was attended by many colonials, but, though Imperial relations were discussed, federation was hardly mentioned. There, however, Labillière said : “ Neither should England tax the Colonies, nor should they tax her. . . . There is little doubt that should Australia remain united to England, as there is every hope she may, when her population is five, ten, twenty millions or more, she will consider it a point of honour to contribute towards the general defence of the Empire.”³

A writer in the *Westminster Review* for July, 1870, would have hastened that day by the creation of an Imperial Council, for, said he, “ were such a council in existence, it is more than probable that the Colonies would gladly consent to pay a certain contribution,

¹ F. Yung, *Imperial Federation*. London, 1876.

² Labillière, *British Federalism : Rise and Progress*. London, 1894.

³ *Ibid.*, *Future Relations of England and her Colonies*. London, 1869.

to be fixed by such a body, towards the naval and military expenditure of the Empire."¹ In the *Contemporary Review* of January, 1871, E. Jenkins wrote an article on "Imperial Federalism," advocating an Imperial Parliament for Imperial affairs. "The Colonies," he urged, "must have a better audience at Whitehall, or they will have done knocking at our doors." In July, the Westminster Palace Hotel Conference was held. There Labillière went further than at Bristol, and openly advocated an Imperial Parliament. His chief object was defence, he said. A Federal Government would have to adjust the share of each member. "Had we some federal authority, the Colonies would even now be ready and willing to contribute a few ships to an Imperial Navy. Victoria has for some years kept up a war-vessel; and recently a question arose whether it should be under Imperial or Colonial control—a difficulty which would have been impossible had there been a Federal Government."² *Fraser's Magazine* at this time also joined in the agitation. In the July and August numbers of 1871 appeared two dialogues whose tone strongly favoured Imperial Federation. An

E. Jenkins,
1871.

West-
minster
Palace
Hotel
Confer-
ence, 1871.

¹ "Future of the British Empire."

² *Report of the Conference of 1871.* London, 1871.

article in the September issue, upon the Imperial connection, advocated Federation as the only possible solution.

Disraeli's
Crystal
Palace
speech,
June, 1872.

Thus the tide was effectively stemmed, but it was not turned till June, 1872, when Disraeli, speaking at the Crystal Palace, pledged the Conservative party to an Imperial policy. His speech removed the last fear that colonial responsible government led to independence. "I cannot conceive how our distant Colonies can have their affairs administered except by self-government. But self-government, in my opinion, when it was conceded, ought to have been conceded as part of a great policy of Imperial consolidation. . . . It ought, further, to have been accomplished by the institution of some representative Council in the metropolis which would have brought the Colonies into constant and continuous relation with the Home Government. . . . In my opinion no Minister does his duty who neglects any opportunity of reconstructing, as much as possible, our Colonial Empire, and of responding to those distant sympathies which may become the sources of incalculable strength and happiness to this land."¹

¹ Quoted by Labillière, *British Federalism : Rise and Progress*. London, 1893.

The question thus thoroughly raised, men began to take a more comprehensive view of the Empire and its problems. They awoke to a realization of the loose nature of Imperial organization, or rather of its complete absence. The character of the British Empire was very cleverly hit off by the Canadian writer, Sam Slick (Judge Haliburton), when he compared it to a barrel without hoops. The fear that the Empire would fall asunder brought forth many possible constitutional hoops.

Tendency to Imperial disruption realized.

In 1876, Frederick Young published his book on Imperial Federation. In it he laid great emphasis upon the proposition, which was eight years later adopted by the Imperial Federation League, that at a certain period in its growth the British Empire must federate or disintegrate. The fear was lest the attitude of England would bring about the latter result.

The weak point was in the foreign relations of the Colonies. Queensland, because of the reluctance of the Foreign Office, acted for herself in the case of New Guinea. To this sin of omission England added one of commission by repudiating the Colony's action. New Zealand threatened to annex the Samoan Islands, in the face of Lord

Foreign relations.

Derby and Prince Bismarck.¹ In Canada also the problem of external affairs exerted considerable pressure. The Treaty of Washington produced a feeling that at no very distant period the people of Canada would desire that they should have some greater share in the control of foreign affairs than they possessed. Edward Blake,² the Canadian Liberal leader, advanced this claim very clearly in a speech delivered at Aurora, Ontario, in 1874: "Our Government," he said, "should not present the anomaly it now presents—a Government, the freest, perhaps the most democratic in the world, with reference to local and domestic matters, in which you rule yourselves as fully as any people in the world, while in your foreign affairs, your relations with other countries, whether peaceful or warlike, commercial, financial, or otherwise, you may have no more voice than the people of Japan."

"We are for ever annexing," said S. W. Kelsey,³ "some portion of the earth's surface; . . . we are never tired of boasting that the

¹ Forster, *Imperial Federation*. London, 1885.

² Labillière, *Federal Britain*; and *Pall Mall Gazette*, January 31, 1885.

³ Kelsey, *Imperial Federation*. London, 1903.

sun never sets on our dominions ; and yet we trouble ourselves but little about their progress, and in our dealings with them display but scant regard for their wishes ; whilst so far from attempting to bind the greater and more valuable Colonies to the Mother Country, we go out of our way to make it plain that whenever they choose to sever the connection which attaches them to the Mother Country, they are at liberty to do so." The same lament was uttered by J. S. Little three years later. England, he said, had piled up a debt of £700,000,000 in purchasing the Empire, but she did nothing to improve this noble heritage or help those who, directly or indirectly, assisted in winning it.¹

Something was wrong with the whole system. "At no stage in the political life of a Colony is there any tendency to become merged in the political life of the Empire at large, but at every stage we can mark a step towards separation from the Mother Country. Nor can it be otherwise. . . . There is no room for representation of the Colonies under the present system."²

¹ J. S. Little, *The United States of Britain*. Guildford, 1886.

² *Westminster Review*, April, 1879, "Federation of the British Empire."

Forster, like Blake, compared the great freedom of the Colonies in dealing with their internal affairs with their exclusion from the administration of foreign or Imperial affairs, and came to the inevitable conclusion that these two opposite principles of freedom and subjection could not long last together.¹

Imperial
honours.

Equally short-sighted seemed the exclusion of colonials from all privileges and honours which were erroneously called Imperial, for the present colonial distrust of hereditary titles had not yet gathered strength. C. W. Eddy was much concerned about this injustice. "Leading colonists," he said, "are not admitted to share in the old-established dignities of the Empire, nor afforded opportunities of distinguishing themselves in the service of the Crown." Many years before, Judge Haliburton had made the same complaint: "Colonists have no nationality, they have no place, no station, no rank. Colonists are the pariahs of the Empire." His son later repeated the refrain. Eddy also remarked how Merivale, at the end of a long career as permanent Colonial Under-Secretary, urged that every honour which the Crown could bestow should be really Im-

¹ *Imperial Federation*. London, 1885.

perial. The "services, military and civil, rendered by colonists to their native Colonies are scarcely, if at all, recognized by the Crown, which is the sole fountain of honour, although such services, in being rendered to the possessions of the Crown, are rendered to the Crown itself." Eddy also urged the extension of the British Bar into an Imperial Bar, where English and colonials could meet upon an equality. Similarly should the Indian Government, he said, be thrown open to colonials, it would greatly strengthen Imperial ties. In short, he advocated that the whole patronage of the Crown should be dispensed alike to all who were born in the Crown's dominions.¹

Not only were the Colonies, under the existing system, drifting towards independence, but England's own sons and daughters, as a result of Imperial arrangements, or rather, lack of them, were pouring out in a stream of emigration to the United States, while vast fertile stretches in the Colonies were lying undeveloped for lack of men. In sixty years,² eight and a half million people had emigrated from Great Britain.

¹ *Royal Colonial Institute Proceedings*, vol. vi.

² 1815-1876.

Of these only three million settled in the Colonies. The rest went to the United States, and were thus lost to the Empire. If the American capitalization of these at £200 apiece was correct, England gave £19,000,000 annually for sixty years to the United States.¹ Some radical change was necessary to check such a serious drain.

The crisis
of 1887.

Thus the whole problem seemed very complicated and very serious. The Colonies bore no part of the huge burden of Imperial defence, they had no share in the management of their external affairs, they were shut out from Imperial honours, and they received but a small proportion of England's surplus population. To find a remedy men turned to some form of Imperial union. Until the first Colonial Conference of 1887, the undoubted ideal of Imperialism was political federation, while an Imperial Council was generally regarded as the wisest step that could be made immediately in that direction. Since its meeting, however, the immediate questions of Imperial Defence and Imperial Preference, apart from all political organization, have pressed themselves upon the public

¹ *Westminster Review*, July, 1879, "Federation of the British Empire."

attention ; but the wisest and most far-seeing Imperialists have steadily maintained that the ultimate end of the whole movement is Federation.

It will be wise to divide the subject under the headings of Defence, Imperial Preference, Federation, and an Imperial Council. As the problem of defence was first seriously raised by the convocation of the Conference of 1887, and as an Imperial commercial union was first seriously proposed by two colonial representatives¹ at its debates, it is easily seen why the first two of these four questions were completely overshadowed by the second two. Opinion was never very strong on commercial union *per se*, and defence was discussed merely from the negative standpoint. The necessity for doing something was emphasized, but no very definite proposals were made. It was the day of Federation.

¹ Sir Samuel Griffith and Mr. Hofmeyr.

CHAPTER VII

DEFENCE

Defence
and
foreign
affairs.

C. W.
Eddy,
1874.

ONE of the first things noticeable in the discussions of defence was the close connection in almost every case between the necessity for common defence and the advisability of an Imperial rather than a national direction of foreign policy. Some even made it the basis of an argument for thorough-going federation. This was the line adopted by C. W. Eddy in a paper read before the Glasgow Social Science Congress: "If confederation means anything, it implies contributions from all the members in proportion to their means to the maintenance of the independence, the support of the power and authority and dignity of the whole." Later in the same paper he remarked that this involved the wider question of colonial representation in the nation's councils. "Colonists have never shown any symptoms of shrinking from the responsibilities which rightly

fall on them. If they were represented in the Imperial Councils, it would naturally follow that they should pay their quota to the Imperial institutions; whilst, on the other hand, if they are persistently denied all concern in the management of the external affairs of the Empire, they will certainly some day demur (as they have already demurred in Australia) to being bound by conditions, or committed by acts, to which they are no parties, and concerning which they were never consulted."¹

This question of defence came gradually to the front until the convocation of the Colonial Conference of 1887, which was summoned largely to secure colonial co-operation with the Mother Country for that very purpose. Meanwhile, nearly every man who discussed the Imperial question proposed, or presupposed, some union for defence, with its corollary—a colonial share in the conduct of foreign affairs which might make active defence necessary.

In 1877, Sir Julius Vogel, the New Zealander, wrote:² "If the great Colonies are to continue parts of the Empire, it is utterly

¹ *Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute*, vol. vi.

² *Nineteenth Century*, July, 1877, "Greater or Lesser Britain."

Sir Julius
Vogel,
1877.

unreasonable that they should be free from all contributions towards national expenditure. The fleet belongs to the nation, and is essentially for the service of the nation, and nothing can justify freeing the Colonies of British America, South Africa, and Australasia from the contribution towards its cost, except the intention to free them from the nation. . . . The Colonies have been too much advanced along the road to self-government to submit to a total exclusion from a share of control in the affairs of the Empire, and we have already admitted that they should contribute to the national expenditure by bearing a portion of the cost of the navy. Obviously the share of control should be increased with the share of contribution. It is not to be supposed that the contribution would be very large at first, though made on strictly fair terms. The proportions of population and property in different parts of the Empire should rule the rate of contribution." Such a fleet would be "a very powerful armament, one so powerful that it would be safe from all attacks, and that it would, as far as could reasonably be expected, relieve the Empire of the dangers and risks of protracted or even brief wars. . . . Each portion of the Confederation would, perhaps,

have its own local forces, and, as it became necessary, provision could be made to give to those forces a combined and consolidated character. . . . The control or representative power should correspond with the contribution."

In a paper on "The Political Organization of the Empire,"¹ read before the Royal Colonial Institute, 1881, Labillière again said that defence was the most important question of common concern. By Imperial organization the Colonies would have full defence and yet hardly feel the cost. All defences of the Empire over and above those required for the purposes of mere provincial police should, he said, be organized upon a uniform and comprehensive Imperial system. Imperial authorities "would have to decide upon questions of naval- and coaling-stations; the strength of the Imperial army and navy; the centres where they should be concentrated; the mode in which they should co-operate with provincial militias and volunteer forces. Naval and military schools and colleges would also eventually have to be established in different parts of the Empire; and though the Imperial army would be small, it would be

F. P. Labillière,
1881.

¹ *Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute*, vol. xii.

desirable to afford the youth, for whom in all parts of the world a soldier's life has great attractions, opportunities of entering the Imperial service. . . . The presence of some regular troops in different parts of the Empire would also be important for the purpose of furnishing a standard of efficiency to provincial militias and volunteers. A greater navy . . . would also soon spring up, if organized on an Imperial basis, without the United Kingdom or any other part of the Empire feeling it to be a burden. It would be sufficient to protect all our coasts, our ocean highways, and our commerce ; for with the increasing numbers of our ships and sailors, the growth of our Colonies and commerce, it is no extravagant expectation that such an Imperial navy would grow up as would render it impossible for any enemy's warship to live upon the ocean."

S. W. Kelsey, 1884.

Three years later S. W. Kelsey wrote in much the same strain : " The time will come—we might almost say has come, when the necessary defences of each Colony and the expense thereof will have to be seriously considered. In a federated Empire the burden will be comparatively small ; in a colonial

federation it would be larger; but in a system of independent Colonies it would be almost unbearable.”¹ In the last case, he remarked, the cultivation of the military instinct would incur the danger that colonial disputes might have to be settled by force of arms.

In March, 1885, the Marquis of Lorne wrote² emphasizing the necessity for an Imperial rather than a national foreign policy: “These Colonies have, therefore, a right to have their wishes consulted, to be informed of what is passing that may lead to war, and in case of the non-observance of that consideration which should be shown by the Imperial Executive, would acquire a right to refuse ships and declare neutrality. . . . It should not be possible for Downing Street to negotiate with France about the abrogation of her fishing rights in Newfoundland without informing Canada of what is contemplated,” nor “propose that France be given islands in the Pacific in lieu of rights in Newfoundland without consulting Australia. If we take these powers of attorney it should be by commission.”

¹ S. W. Kelsey, *Imperial Federation*. London, 1903.

² *Nineteenth Century*.

W. E.
Forster,
1885.

Forster, in his excellent paper on Imperial Federation, said that the Colonies were feeling after a share in the burden of Imperial defence. If Great Britain were to ask them, he continued, to co-operate by taxing themselves for defence, the demand for participation in the Imperial foreign policy would gather strength. His conclusion was that to save the Empire from being broken up there must be some common organization for mutual defence and for the conduct of the Empire's foreign policy. The existing situation was extremely unsatisfactory. The Colonies would not deny that the defence of their ports and cities lay primarily with them, and that the protection of commerce was the business of all. With coaling-stations the case was equally clear. The Australian Colonies had "accepted and acted up to the recommendations of the Commissioners" of 1878. Moreover, they would go "further, and, if deemed desirable, would form an arsenal and establish factories for war material." But they would do nothing beyond their own shores. No matter how essential to them were the fortifications of Aden or Singapore, the colonists would not contribute to their upkeep. If, however,

the case were fully presented to them, he thought they might recognize their share in the necessity of keeping open the route between England and Australia, and perhaps that between China and Australia.

Captain Colomb's two papers¹ on Colonial and Imperial defence, though read as early as 1873 and 1877 respectively, afford a fitting conclusion to these remarks, for in them he gave perhaps the most comprehensive exposition of the problem of defence. The burden of his argument was the necessity for co-operation in defending the strategic points of the Empire, such as St. Helena, the Falkland Islands, Mauritius, King George's Sound, and Vancouver. "The Imperial roads cannot be kept open unless such places are secured independently of the protection of the sea-going fleets, and therefore if the Mother Country and her Colonies do not come to some common and really Imperial understanding as to how these places are to be provided with sufficient garrisons, adequate defences, and naval resources, a great war will find our fleet helplessly watching their bases, while home and colonial merchant-

Captain
Colomb,
1873 and
1877.

¹ *Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute*, vols. iv. and viii.

ships are being chased over the ocean like hares by Alabama greyhounds. . . . We are too apt to believe that there is a wide difference between Imperial and Colonial responsibilities in war. . . . The problem of Imperial security cannot be solved by disintegrating that which is common to all; it is a burden resting proportionably on every fragment of the Empire, and *distinctions are not those of responsibility but of practical ability. The weak must bear the burden according to their weakness, the strong according to their strength. The problem is not one of division but of adjustment.*¹ The misfortune is that Imperial policy has been directed, not towards adjusting the burden, but has really thrown it down, leaving the United Kingdom and the Colonies to cut off bits of it here and there according to selfish, mistaken interests of self-preservation, and the result is that much of it remains repudiated by both." Why should the Colonies, he asked, leave the Mother Country to protect their vast coast-line and their ocean trade? "Without some binding federal arrangement as to the distribution or organization and maintenance of war power, the Colony that buried its

¹ The italics are not Captain Colomb's.

talent in peace may in war reap the solid advantages of assistance from us at the expense of others, who, meanwhile, have made ten. But more than this, are the residents of the United Kingdom to be left to give or withhold assistance at will and be free from any binding federal obligations? Or are they to be expected to have real Imperial strength without the power to draw from the whole Empire, in proportion to the resources of its several parts, real Imperial power?" After carefully reviewing the Imperial naval position, he concluded: "Such facts as these sufficiently indicate that the burden of protection of our common commerce in war must be shared and justly distributed according to the capacity of the several joints in the Imperial back; they point unmistakably, first, to federal naval possessions; and next, to a federal fleet, and a federal movable army to support the fleet."

Though many remarked the necessity of ^{Imperial} co-operation for Imperial defence, few made definite proposals as to how the sinews of war were to be supplied. Nor is this surprising. When men believed in federation, or at least in an Imperial Council, they regarded an Imperial revenue as a corollary of political union, and the natural result of representation.

Thus they were not seriously concerned about the particular manner in which it should be raised. Some, like Joseph Howe,¹ favoured an Imperial tariff; others, like Young,² thought of voluntary contributions or subsidies from the Colonial Governments; while a few believers in a close political union supposed it would take the form of a uniform Imperial tax.³ There were two or three other schemes which fall into none of these categories. Sir A. T. Galt⁴ and J. S. Little⁵ proposed a tax upon the tonnage of ships entering Imperial ports, while William Greswell⁶ suggested that a revenue might be derived from the difference between the rates of interest paid on loans by the British Government on the one hand, and by the Colonial Governments on the other. The Imperial Government, able to borrow at a lower rate, could, he said, supply loans to the Colonial Governments at their current rates and appropriate the difference. But these plans have no special interest, for they had little influence upon contemporary opinion.

¹ *Imperial Organization*. London, 1866.

² *Address on Federation*. London, 1885.

³ Edwin Guthrie, *Home Rule and Federation*. Manchester, 1887. ⁴ *Pall Mall Gazette*, January 28, 1885.

⁵ *The United States of Britain*. Guildford, 1886.

⁶ *National Review*, January, 1887.

CHAPTER VIII

COMMERCIAL PREFERENCE

THE question of Imperial preference, which, with that of Imperial defence, has been for some years the chief interest of the Imperial-thinking public, had its origin in the old colonial policy. The Colonies were to supply the Mother Country with all the raw products she needed, and, at the same time, afford an extensive market for her manufactured goods. But the old colonial policy was exploded by the American Revolution, and Imperial opinion was bewildered for many years. The adoption of Free Trade seemed to put a decisive end to all possibility of a commercial union within the Empire. There would have been no doubt of this had not the cause of English Free Trade and Colonial Protection raised its head in the Colonies. There came the rub. Men believed that the dismemberment of the Empire would certainly follow upon the erection of internal commercial barriers. The Liberals, who erected Free

Trade into a fetish, regarded dismemberment as inevitable, and so did not care about the Imperial results of their policy, or rather fanaticism. The Conservatives, on the other hand, who were opposed to Free Trade, were very positive about its baneful effects. Though the cause of Imperial preference never attained that importance before 1887 which it has held since then, and was not regarded so seriously as federation, or an Imperial Council, still it grew in proportion as the cause of Protection grew in the Colonies, till many, though not all, Imperialists agreed with Captain Colomb that as it was commerce, not cannon, which made the German Empire, so the foundations of British unity might be laid in a British Zollverein.¹

Labillière. Labillière, the great apostle of Imperialism, like many of his co-believers, did not adopt a decided opinion upon this subject. At the Westminster Palace Hotel Conference² of 1871, he said it was desirable, but not absolutely necessary, for Imperial Confederation that there should be a uniform fiscal policy. He even admitted that the different provinces of the Empire might impose protective duties

¹ F. Young, *Address on Federation*. London, 1885.

² *Report of the Conference of 1871*. London, 1871.

upon each other without affecting the Union. Ten years later, however, he was not quite so indifferent. Speaking then at the Royal Colonial Institute,¹ he said that Imperial federation need not interfere with existing provincial fiscal policies, but that in time the great advantage of an Imperial commercial policy would be felt. For the sake of greater extension of Free Trade in the world, England, he said, "might find it wise to abandon or modify that policy, as regards foreign countries which so resolutely oppose it, if by so doing she could promote its adoption throughout the Empire." It would, he continued, prevent millions from emigrating to the United States, where they created industries to compete with Great Britain, and divert them to the Colonies. "It would be the greatest triumph of Free Trade, short of universal adoption amongst all nations, to be extended throughout the length and breadth of the Empire of Great Britain."

It was in the seventies that the shoe began to pinch. In 1850 the Act for settling the constitutions of the Australian Colonies prohibited the imposition of intercolonial differential tariffs. After a time an agitation grew

Growth of
Colonial
Protec-
tion.

¹ *Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute*, vol. xii.

up against this restriction, and bore fruit in 1873, when the British Government repealed the offending clause. Thus released, the Australian Colonies indulged in a regular carnival of unenlightened Protection against everybody. In Canada also the cause of Protection grew, and toward the end of that decade, John A. Macdonald based upon it his National Policy. This movement in the Colonies was what stirred up the cry for Imperial Preference. Even outsiders were interested. An American advised the Federation of the Empire, arguing that it would break down all tariff barriers dividing the various members, so that an Imperial barrier might be erected around all, and the integration of the Empire be pushed one step farther.¹ It was natural for an American to adopt this view, for even yet they cannot understand the absence of an Imperial tariff.

The example of the United States was very popular. Many advised the Free Traders to confine their fanaticism to the bounds of the practical, and secure Free Trade within the largest area, but with

¹ *The Integration of the British Empire from an American Standpoint.* London, 1875.

Protection against the rest of the world,¹ declaring that this was the secret of American prosperity. The whole tariff arrangement, they said, was wrong, and certainly there were grounds for that belief. Not only was British trade and shipping being injured by Colonial Protection,² but the British duty on wines favoured France and Spain to the detriment of Australia.³ Well might Earl Grey say that "if the Imperial Government is to have no voice in determining upon the commercial measures of the Colonies, and they are even to be allowed to levy upon British goods protective duties more burdensome than those imposed by most foreign countries, it may come to pass that the people of this country, finding the connection between the Parent State and the Colonies thus reduced to a barren responsibility on the part of the former for the defence of its dependencies, may decline to go on submitting to the burden."⁴

Had the Colonies been uncompromisingly committed to a narrow policy of Protection,

Favouring
oppor-
tunity.

¹ J. S. Little, *The United States of Britain*. Guildford, 1886.

² *Westminster Review*, October, 1879.

³ S. W. Kelsey, *Imperial Federation*. London, 1903.

⁴ *Nineteenth Century*, June, 1879.

this would have put an end to the question. But such was not the case. The Australian tariff-union movement seemed a preliminary step towards a greater Imperial union ; while in Canada, Macdonald inclined toward an Imperial Zollverein,¹ and the Dominion Board of Trade passed a resolution that it was desirable to draw closer the political and trade relations between Great Britain and the Colonies.² Joseph Howe, the Nova Scotian, also favoured the idea. Thus the way was clear for the readjustment of the application of the Free Trade principle.

Union for
Protec-
tion.

Roper Lethbridge, in the *National Review*,³ lamented the languishing of British trade as a result of foreign tariffs, and concluded that "our only chance of rehabilitating our commerce seems to be a federation with our Colonies." The only obstacle, he said, was the fetish-worship of Free Trade. Instead of serving, it ruled economic and practical interests. Like the American who urged Imperial integration, as well as many others, he argued in favour of federation because it would bring about a customs union. This is the exact reverse of the modern idea that pre-

¹ *Pall Mall Gazette*, January 28, 1885.

² *Proceedings of the July Conference*. London, 1884.

³ March, 1885.

ference might gradually knit the Empire into a closer unity. But the distinction was not yet clear. Some urged federation for the sake of Free Trade within the Empire; others preached a commercial unity which would bring in its train political union; while others again in a general manner advanced both at once. Forster would have desired an Imperial Zollverein, but trusted it would come after his Council had begun its work of uniting the Empire, just as Labillière hoped the same result would follow upon Federation. The *Westminster Review* in 1879 supported both ideas equally.

A few, however, advocated some form of commercial union without confusing it with any political design. A Conservative in the *National Review*¹ advised simply "taxing foreign imports while granting free admission to colonial products of all kinds." This, he said, would make it the interest, rather than the pleasure, of the Colonies to remain in the Empire and share in its defence. Lord Dunraven² said that colonial representatives in the British Government would not make it sufficiently worth while, from a business point of view, for the Colonies to remain in

Or Protec-
tion for
union.

Pure Pro-
tection.

*National
Review*,
April,
1885.

Lord Dun-
raven.

¹ April, 1885.

² *Pall Mall Gazette*, January 28, 1885.

the Empire. Though a Free Trader, he confessed that he was prepared to sacrifice his abstract theories for a short cut to actual Free Trade. He urged the imposition of a 10 per cent. *ad valorem* duty upon all manufactured goods from all foreign countries into the kingdom, and an equivalent specific duty on breadstuffs, along with the free admission of colonial foodstuffs. In this he was stirred by more than Imperial motives; he admitted the instinct of self-protection. It would free England from her dependence upon foreigners for bread. Still, the whole Imperial movement is not a philanthropic discussion; at the back of it all is the desire for mutual protection and defence.

T. Gibson
Bowles,
*Fort-
nightly
Review*,
1885.

One of the best expositions of the case was made by T. Gibson Bowles.¹ He said that the unity of the British race might be accomplished without adopting any political suggestions or in the least violating the sanctity of the Constitution. Dividing the Colonies into three groups of (1) the Great Colonies, (2) the Crown Colonies, and (3) India and Ceylon, he remarked that what they wanted was (i.) a market for their products of food and other raw materials, (ii.) a supply of

¹ *Fortnightly Review*, May, 1885.

manufactures for their population, and (iii.) a supply of labour for the first group. The United Kingdom's wants were (a) a supply of food and other raw materials, (b) a market for its manufactures, and (c) an outlet for its surplus population. Thus the Colonies and the Mother Country, he discovered, were mutual complements. The Colonies, supplying a quarter of England's imports, and receiving nearly half her exports, were each year both absolutely and relatively absorbing more of England's trade. This point he established firmly by marshalling long lines and columns of figures. Thus British merchants, he said, must look more and more to the Colonies as a growing storehouse and an expanding market. He proposed taking the twenty millions of customs duties levied at the ports, most of which was raised on tobacco, tea, spirits, wine, and coffee, and redistributing this so that the same aggregate charge should be levied on the trade of the country, but in such a way that the burden should be laid on a few additional articles, and press a little more on foreign goods than on the produce of the Colonies. A slight change of rates would suffice, he said. One shilling a quarter on

corn could not be opposed by Free Traders. They had long imposed such a duty under the name of a registration fee. Foreign tea might be charged 6d. a pound, while Indian tea paid only 5½d. Just a little like this on all the articles could turn the balance between colonial and foreign trade strongly in favour of the former. The Colonies, with an increased demand for their products, would flourish; their untilled land would be occupied; and a stimulus would be given to population which would be partly met by immigration. British merchants would find a wider market for their goods than the foreign market, which was gradually closing, and the great Empire would be self-sufficing. Then there would be a union between its members "such as no councils of federation could affect, yet such as no great wisdom would be required to maintain; for it would be a union founded upon the most lasting basis—that of a common interest—and held together by the strongest ties—those of mutual material dependence." But this ideal of a material union unconnected with any political organization is so closely related to the projects of later days that it seems hardly a part of the Imperial movement of its time.

CHAPTER IX

FEDERATION

THOUGH Federation was the great ideal of the nineteenth century, a few, at the outset, advised representation in the Imperial Parliament. Some proposed, as in the previous century, that colonial representatives should sit in the House of Commons.

The cause of representation was urged as early as 1831, long before the Imperial movement began. During the discussion of the Reform Bill, colonial representation was proposed by Joseph Hume,¹ the man who caused the addition of "retrenchment" to the Radical programme, "peace and reform." The readjustment of representation, he argued, should be carried out logically, and applied to the Colonies. The Reform Bill should be Imperial and not merely national. He limited his proposal to the addition of

¹ Hansard, 3rd series, vol. vi., p. 111.

only nineteen members. To British India he assigned four; to the Crown Colonies, eight; to British America, three; to the West Indies, three; and to Jersey, Guernsey, Alderney, and Sark, one. He defended the disproportionate adjustment of representation between the Crown Colonies and the Colonies with Assemblies, on the ground that the former, unlike the latter, possessed no voice in the management of their affairs. It is an interesting proposal, but, if intended seriously, it was not so taken, for it was greeted throughout its exposition by continual outbursts of laughter. These afford a fine comment upon the state of Imperial feeling at that time. Many years elapsed before the cause of representation was again advanced.

Representa-
tion in
the House
of Com-
mons.

In the discussion following Macfie's paper in the Royal Colonial Institute, 1871,¹ Youl advocated the idea saying that he regarded "proper representation of the Colonies in the Imperial Parliament as a thing which must come to pass sooner or later." Two weeks later, before the same Society, William Westgarth² made a similar proposal: "Let

¹ *Royal Colonial Institute Proceedings*, vol. iii.

² *Ibid.*

us arrange our Colonies into a few great groups, five or six in all, and let our Government invite each group to send one representative to Parliament." In 1875 an American¹ suggested a like representation: "Each Colony, having such a local legislature for its special interests, would stand related to the Imperial Government and Parliament only by the senatorial connection that exists between each American State and the Federal Government and Congress at Washington. Of course a popular representation in the Imperial Parliament for all these Colonies is entirely out of the question. It would be all that each could claim, or need, to be represented by two senators. . . . Thus 100 representatives would be all that would be necessary or desirable to be brought into Parliament from all these scattered domains of the Empire." But the general feeling, however, was strongly opposed to such colonial representation. From the colonial standpoint it would have been inadequate, while from the English

¹ *The Integration of the British Empire from an American Standpoint*. London, 1875. The author may have intended the Colonies to be represented in the House of Lords.

standpoint it was impossible. The House of Commons had already too many members, and it was crowded with too much business to permit any chance of further confusion by the introduction of strangers. Moreover, it would be as unfair for colonials to meddle with the Government of England as for Englishmen to interfere in purely colonial problems.

Represent-
ation in
House of
Lords.
Lord
Rosebery,
1884.

Lord Rosebery, however, whose Imperialism drew great strength from his tour round the world in 1882, started a new¹ idea; he suggested opening the House of Lords to colonial representatives. This he urged before the July Conference of 1884² as a tentative experiment on the parallel of the United States Senate, and a few, though not many, adopted the idea. An anonymous writer, a member of the Federation League,³ advocating Grey's plan of a Colonial Council, thought it might be greatly strengthened by a liberal introduction into the House

¹ Cf. p. 26. Chatham's first plan proposed colonial representation in the House of Lords, but not his second.

² *Report of the Westminster Palace Hotel Conference*, July. London, 1884.

³ *Imperial Federation: What should be the next Step?* By a Leaguer. London, 1885.

of Lords of colonists as life-peers. Frederick F. Wicks. Wicks also strongly favoured the suggestion. "Inasmuch as the main difficulty in the way," he wrote,¹ "is that of taxation, the colonial representatives might sit and vote in the House of Lords. The proposal is a startling one, but no more so than the admission of Judges, not being peers, to sit as a Court of Appeal. If the projected reform of the House of Lords were achieved in the direction of selecting a given number of their order, and associating them with the Judges and the colonial representatives for all purposes of legislation, the arrangement would be freer of anomalies than any other. The House of Lords can reject money Bills now, but cannot initiate or amend them. There would be no objection to colonial representatives joining in the exercise of that limited authority. The House of Lords would be materially strengthened in popular estimation by including within its walls the voice of the Colonies ; and if colonial legislation were passed through the House of Lords so constituted, before receiving the Royal Assent, one great object would be achieved in the tendency this would create to promote the

¹ *National Review*, September, 1886.

assimilation of Colonial and Imperial legislation." But this idea did not take hold upon the popular mind, and, with these exceptions, Federation, and not representation in the existing Parliament, was the Imperial ideal of the nineteenth century.

Federation.

American,
1875.

The principle of Federation, which had derived new vigour from its adoption in the United States Constitution, drew much strength from the German and Canadian experiments. The two cases, of United States and Canada, lying side by side seemed more than a coincidence. One writer¹ made bold to say that it was a great characteristic of the English race, where a number of Colonies appeared in the same land, for them to be drawn by a natural instinct into a political union under a Federal government. "This centripetal attraction grows with the growth, and strengthens with the strength, of all the municipal, colonial and other confederate communities of the English-speaking race all round the globe. . . . What stands in the way to prevent this political instinct or law from having its free and natural course and natural consummation?"

¹ *The Integration of the British Empire from an American Standpoint.* London, 1875.

What prevents that political integration of the British Empire and the direct representation of all its Colonies, provinces, and dependencies in the Imperial Parliament at London?" This was perhaps exalting a couple of facts into a very great principle. Still, Federation was the ideal of most Imperialists even when they advocated some other measure as an expedient. Almost all the proposals were intended in the end to work round to Federation.

In 1871, Macfie,¹ at the Royal Colonial In-
stitute, and E. Jenkins,² in the *Contemporary Review*, advocated Federation. Macfie urged that "we people of the Mother Land must recognize the colonists as fellow-subjects entitled to possess equal rights to our own; that is, the colonists must not only be independent in the way of self-government, but invested with an equitable portion to rule over and on behalf of the whole Empire, of which they form now an important and most progressive, integral part. In other words, there must be Federation of the Empire." Jenkins,^{E. Jenkins.} however, was more definite. "A Senate or Parliament," he said, "of representatives from

¹ *Royal Colonial Institute Proceedings*, vol. iii.

² *Contemporary Review*, January, 1871: "Imperial Federation."

every province, deliberating in public, and acting on the decision of the majority, would of necessity satisfy all the objections to the existing system. All other schemes such as that of a representative Colonial Council, Colonial Ministers, limited representation in the Imperial Parliament, and so forth, dwindle before the practical simplicity of Federal union." Its benefits would be undoubted: "how important an effect the opening to the British colonists of a large field of Imperial ambition would have on each community in inciting to enterprise, quickening education, awakening talent; or, conversely, how great an access of ability would be made to Imperial councils by sifting every part of the Empire to minister to their force" would soon become apparent. To accomplish the end of Federation, he recognized that Irish Home Rule would be necessary. Others, however, pushing farther into the subject, demonstrated that the adoption of the principle of Home Rule all round was an essential part of any Federal scheme.

F. P.
Labillière.

Labillière, born in Melbourne, and brought up in Victoria, could well speak for the Colonies, and he was one of the strongest exponents of Federation. His speech before

the Westminster Palace Hotel Conference of 1871, his papers before the Royal Colonial Institute in 1875 and 1881, and his letter to *The Colonies*, reprinted in Frederick Young's *Imperial Federation*, all argued very strongly in favour of Imperial Federation. "The only ultimate goal for us, if the union of our Empire is to be real and lasting, is Federation . . . the only known force which can weld our Empire into one great power, giving all its people a voice in whatever policy concerns them, and utilizing for their peace and security the great strength which, if solidified, they will be able to command. Federation implies that there shall be a central Parliament and Executive of the Empire, like those of America, Germany, or Switzerland. . . . To give all parts of the Empire a voice in its Government, a truly Imperial Parliament would have to be created ; the present Parliament being left to occupy itself with concerns of Great Britain and Ireland, which monopolize its attention and supply it with more business than it can get through. Representation of the Colonies in it could not be made sufficiently Federal in its character unless the number of members of the House of Commons, already large enough, were increased, or those

for the United Kingdom diminished, in order to make room for a due proportion of colonial representatives. . . . The only conceivable advantage of having a few members for the Colonies, in the British Parliament, would be that their presence would be an admission of the Federal principle, and might demonstrate the necessity and stimulate the desire throughout the Empire for a complete Federation.”¹

He recognized that other means might lead to his great end, and, moreover, that it would not be wise to strike out toward it immediately. “We shall have to go by steps, though they must not be too slow. A Council of Empire has been suggested. Perhaps it would be the best thing to begin with, were it called into existence merely to prepare the way for something better. It might be entrusted with the task of preparing a Federal Constitution. . . . The bonds of unity must not press too tightly ; they must not interfere with complete self-government, but they must be tight and strong enough to hold us together, to keep us shoulder to shoulder for purposes of mutual support and defence, to give full expression to the wishes

¹ *Royal Colonial Institute Proceedings*, vol. vi. : “Permanent Unity of the Empire.”

of all our people on questions of importance to them all.”¹ His ultimate design was very comprehensive. The terms of the arrangement were to be first settled by delegates representing the Mother Country and the Colonies, and then were to be ratified by their respective governments.²

An Imperial Legislature was to be set up. The sacrifice thereby entailed upon the existing House of Parliament would be merely that of a little pride. Nine-tenths of its business would remain untouched. It would, moreover, be somewhat relieved of the great existing pressure.³ This Imperial House might be elected by the people themselves or by the various legislatures of the Empire acting as electoral colleges. . . . “The system of making the people the electors has this great advantage, that it would bring the Imperial Confederate Parliament into direct contact with the inhabitants of the whole Empire, and make them feel that its central Government was thoroughly their own. Peace or war made with its approval would be their peace or war ; defences organized by it would

¹ *Report of Westminster Palace Hotel Conference, 1871*, Labillièvre's speech.

² F. Young, *Imperial Federation*, letter iii. ³ *Ibid.*

be felt to belong to them all. It would be able directly to impose taxes; whereas, if elected by the Legislatures, it could only require each of them to contribute a fixed amount to the Imperial revenue. The system of election by Parliaments could, however, be more easily worked."¹ It would obviate, he continued, the difficulty of arranging a territorial representation of each Province. There would be a greater number of first-class men, and they would more likely be in harmony with their local legislatures.

The second question was the number of chambers in this new Legislature.² If the people were electors, there would be greater necessity for a second house. In any case, however, he considered a second chamber advisable. His composition³ of this second chamber, or Imperial House of Lords, was interesting. There were to be three sections. (1) A proportion of the existing hereditary peers were to represent the United Kingdom, half of these to be nominated by the Crown and half by the House of Lords. (2) For

¹ *Report of Proceedings of the Conference held at the Westminster Palace Hotel.* London, 1871.

² *Ibid.*

³ F. Young, *Imperial Federation*, letter iii.

distinguished services, the Crown was to have power to confer hereditary peerages of the Empire upon any of its subjects. (3) Colonial members were to be created for life by the Crown upon the nomination of the colonial Executives; they should have titles, not hereditary, from places in the Colonies. "An Imperial Senate, constituted as suggested . . . would consist of picked men from the peerage of England and from the aristocracy of intellect and statesmanship of the whole British Empire."

The powers he would reserve to this Central Government he enumerated in 1881.¹ Defence, of course, would be its first duty. His remarks on this have already been noted.² "Common defence means common expense." The common expenses would be met by direct taxation if the Imperial Parliament was elected by the people, otherwise it could only impose levies upon the several Legislatures. Foreign affairs would also lie within its sphere. "Joint defence at joint expense entitles to joint control of foreign affairs. . . . All treaties and negotiations

¹ *Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute*, vol. xii.: "The Political Organization of the Empire."

² *Cf.* p. 129.

with foreign nations should be conducted through and by an Imperial administration, responsible to a Parliament in which every portion of the Empire should have its fair share of representation." Those exposed to common danger should be heard even though they possessed but little strength to aid in defence. Extensions of the Empire would likewise be under Imperial supervision, "the new territories being in the first instance under its immediate control, as Crown Colonies are at present ; but afterwards they should be attached to the nearest province of the Empire, or, on becoming of sufficient importance, should be invested with all the powers of self-government." In 1876 Eastern New Guinea, he pointed out, would have been annexed, had the Australian Colonies replied to Lord Carnarvon that they would contribute to the expense of administration. They refused because they would have no control of the territory for which they were asked to pay. The English Government, on the other hand, refused to bear the burden, for Australia was the more interested party. India, he said, would prove no obstacle to organized union of the British Empire : "it would be much better for the Mother Country

to share the advantages as well as the risks and burdens of governing India with her partners in the Empire than retain both herself." Foreign affairs handed over to the Imperial Government, the administration of India could not be retained by the United Kingdom alone without causing difficulties with foreign powers. Naturalization, of course, would be regulated by Imperial authority, as it would be admission into Imperial citizenship.

The principle of local self-government was to remain inviolate. England ought not to interfere in the local business of the Colonies, nor should they meddle in purely English affairs. Church Establishment he recognized as within the competence of provincial governments. Education should be similarly controlled, except for the Universities, which should have some Imperial standing. The provincial control of land laws, as well as taxation, should remain untouched. Internal defence, he thought, should be treated similarly, for the Colonies would soon outgrow the stage when they would require aid in native wars.

In a third category he included matters which might be left to either provincial or Imperial management. Such were marriage

laws, domicile, wills, coinage, copyrights and patents, railways and telegraphs, emigration, reciprocity, and final courts of appeal.

Such was Labillière's exposition of Imperial Federation. "Without confederation," he said, "I do not know how we can ultimately get on." "Common defence involves common expense; common expense and danger confer the right of common control of foreign affairs, from which danger may arise, and of the forces required for defence; common control must be by common representation; common representation is Imperial Federation."¹

Frederick
Young.

In 1876, Frederick Young published his book,² in which he embodied a strong plea for Imperial Federation. The book was a collection of letters from various correspondents, including himself, which had been published in *The Colonies* in the latter part of 1875 and in the early months of 1876. In it he pressed home three propositions: (1) At a certain period of its growth the British Empire would federate or disintegrate. (2) There was no reason why the former should not be accomplished and the latter avoided. (3) If the British nation could once be convinced of the

¹ *Royal Colonial Institute Proceedings*, vol. xii.

² F. Young, *Imperial Federation*. London, 1876.

advantages of Federation, so as to accept the principle, the details providing the necessary legislative and executive machinery for carrying it out would gradually unfold themselves and culminate in the adoption of a practical scheme. "Federation on the thoroughly broad basis of the construction of a new Imperial Parliament, containing representatives in equitable proportion from every part of our Home and Colonial Empire to manage and settle Imperial questions, is the only one which would satisfy the just requirements of the Colonies, and meet the expectations of the English people scattered over the wide expanse of so many regions of the globe."¹

He invoked the historical and constitutional parallel of the extension and consolidation of government over the whole area of the British Isles. "In this process, followed without interruption for more than six hundred years, we have at once the model and the example to be followed now, in order to bind the whole Empire into an homogeneous and indissoluble union. Why should the Australasian group, the Cape, and the Dominion of Canada, not be regarded as an *extension of*

¹ Letter vii.

the counties of England, sending their proper proportion of representatives—just as Middlesex and Yorkshire, Cornwall and Northumberland—to the British Parliament? Undoubtedly the Parliament of the future would have to be constructed on an entirely new basis. The Imperial Assembly would be formed to deal alone with Imperial questions—viz., those affecting the interests of the whole Empire, such as treaties with foreign countries, or defence, or peace and war, etc. The Foreign and Colonial Ministers, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer would be chosen from the Imperial Assembly, while probably Ministers like the Home Secretary and President of the Board of Trade would be selected as a separate Cabinet for domestic affairs from such a Parliament as we now have, and which would, like the Parliaments of the various Colonies, only deal with local laws and home administrations—English, Irish, and Scotch. No doubt all this involves a radical reconstruction of the Imperial representative body; but it is only the extension to every part of the Empire of the system already cited, which was inaugurated in the early period of our history, when England had no Colonies, and when it was more

difficult to hold communication with the distant parts of our island than it is now with the most remote regions of our Colonial Empire."¹

The controversy which this very strong letter provoked discovered, besides Labillière, two other advocates of Imperial Federation. The Hon. William Fox, formerly Premier of New Zealand, took serious objection to Young's comparison of the Colonies with the counties of England.² Though Young was obdurate in this particular, Fox agreed with his general principle. At the outset he expressed himself mildly, saying that the Colonies were entitled to feel themselves an integral portion of a great nation.³ Two months later he condemned as inadequate even such an expedient as a council of advice. "The way can only be prepared by a fundamental change in the Constitution. The council suggested would have no tendency to effect that change."⁴

The other convert, who signed himself "A Constant Reader," expressed himself more strongly. "In order to insure the maximum of security and strength which any power can possibly attain at the minimum of

¹ Letter i.

² *Ibid.* ii.

³ *Ibid.* ii.

⁴ *Ibid.* viii.

cost to the whole British people, the present Parliament of England and those of the Colonies would only have to hand over to a joint Executive and Legislature, in which all portions of the Empire would be fairly represented, the management of their common defences, and, necessarily, of their foreign policy. Of course a power of raising revenue from all parts of the Empire would be involved in extending Federal representation to them; and whether or not an Imperial Constitution should limit the power of the Imperial Parliament in raising revenue, it is certain that the amount of taxation for defence and diplomatic purposes, which the people of this country and of every Colony would have to pay to the Imperial exchequer, would be infinitely smaller than they would have had to contribute for the same purposes to their own separate governments should they set up completely on their own account.”¹

Sir Julius
Vogel.

In the following year the New Zealand politician, Sir Julius Vogel, wrote² also with Federation as his ultimate aim. His prophetic vision, however, was not so clear. His

¹ Letter xvi.

² *Nineteenth Century*, 1877: “Greater or Lesser Britain.”

reference to the presence of colonial representatives in the French Legislature, and the presence of delegates from the territories of United States in the American House of Representatives, suggests that a similar idea for England may have run through his mind. Earlier in the same article he said: "The question of representation is the great stumbling-block in the way of confederation, not on account of its real, but of its fancied difficulties." He objected to swamping the House of Commons with colonial votes. Local government should not be interfered with in Great Britain any more than in the Colonies. "The aim should be to build up a Federal government without impairing the machinery of ordinary government." Whilst the Colonies "would not consent to be excluded from a prospect of either independence or of control in Federal affairs, they are by no means as eager for immediate representation. For some time to come they will be content with representation at the Board of Advice to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. . . .

"After a time, which could easily be designated in advance, the population, wealth, and importance of the Colonies would entitle them

to more direct representation, and their representatives should form part of the Federal legislative body. The constitution of the Federal Legislature would not involve much difficulty. The House of Lords, as one Chamber of it, would equally be available for the Federal Legislature as for the ordinary Legislature of Great Britain. There is nothing to prevent persons who may reside in the Colonies from being called to the peerage, and already many peers possess considerable colonial estates. The House of Commons, as the House of Commons for Great Britain, should not be disturbed. It is a question very important, but which need not be decided at the moment of confederation, whether the Federal Lower Chamber should be the House of Commons plus the colonial representatives, or whether the Federal representatives of Great Britain should be distinctly and separately selected. The Imperial Parliament, until the Federal Parliament grew into being, should, as it is now, be superior ; and the Government of the United Kingdom would be the Executive of the Confederated Empire.

“ The measure of confederacy, then, which we advocate is a declaration that the Col-

onies are inseparably portions and provinces of Great Britain; that all parts of the Empire should contribute to the cost and maintenance of the fleet; and that, in the course of time, as the importance of the outlying dominions warrants it, all parts of the Empire shall be represented in the Federal Legislature; and that, in the meanwhile, the Colonies be represented at a Board (or Council) of Advice to the Secretary of State for the Colonies."¹ Like Sir Julius Vogel, all the other advocates of a Council of Advice, and practically all who advanced other expedients, had as their ideal the ultimate federation of the Empire.

The *Westminster Review* in 1879² also urged Imperial Federation. Frederick Young, in the first letter in his book, had said that the creation of an Imperial Constitution would be a great revolution. The Hon. William Fox was of the same mind, but went farther, saying that it would be about the greatest revolution in English history,—quite as important as that of 1688. The writer

*West-
minster
Review,*
1879.

¹ *Nineteenth Century*, 1877: "Greater or Lesser Britain."

² The plan appended was strongly endorsed by Young at Amsterdam in 1883.

of the *Westminster* articles, however, opposed this idea. "Though the form of such a Federal Parliament is quite new to the English, it is quite in accordance with the political genius of the Empire."¹ The English system unchecked would have led to disintegration, but in the outlying parts of the Empire the principle of federation had gathered strength and become the sole hope of Imperial integrity. This, he said, should be introduced into England, and a uniform system established throughout the Empire, by the institution of local Parliaments for England, Scotland, and Ireland. He urged that the principle of development should not be regarded in its narrow English sense, but should be viewed in the broader light of Empire.²

Others advocated the establishment of an entirely new House superior to all then existing, but he, more faithful to the principle of development, sought, by readjustment, to elevate the Imperial Parliament. The overcrowding of business in the Commons, he pointed out, must be met by

¹ *Westminster Review*, April, 1879: "Federation of the English Empire."

² *Ibid.*

a separation of local from Imperial affairs, leaving the Imperial House free for truly Imperial measures. Thus purged, it could allow the introduction of colonial representatives. "In the Imperial House every part of the Empire would, as a matter of right, be represented. The Imperial House would stand in the same relation to Australia or Canada as to England or Ireland."¹

He proposed the following distribution of members for the Imperial House as preserving nearly the proportions in which members are allotted now, and at the same time, while fully airing colonial opinion, retaining a proper preponderance to England: England, 185; Scotland, 25; Ireland, 40; the Colonies, 50; a total of 300. There would, he added, be a periodical redistribution according to the growth of population. The colonial representatives were to be distributed as follows: Canada and Newfoundland, 20; Australia, 15; New Zealand, 5; the Cape Settlements, 5; the West Indies, 5. These were to be chosen, not by the respective Legislatures, but by popular election, the electoral districts being marked out

¹ *Westminster Review*, October, 1879: "Federation of the English Empire."

by the various Governments. A second chamber for this Imperial Parliament he found already to hand in the existing House of Lords.¹ Some change, however, would be necessary ; twenty life peers might be added to represent the Colonies, and of course the Bishops would have to withdraw, as the Church of England was a purely local matter. The Ministry of the day was to be selected from both these Houses, and should be the responsible advisers of the Crown. The Parliament was to sit annually in London, and should continue five years unless terminated earlier by a dissolution.

The province of the Imperial House was to include the maintenance of the Royal Family, the control of the army and navy, the administration of foreign affairs, the supervision of general relations between the various parts of the Empire. Marine and shipping affairs, customs and finance, the post-office, and superior justice, were also to be under its direction. Assuming that one local house would represent the British Isles, the latter were to be placed under a Viceroy or Governor nominated by the Crown in Council. Second chambers in

¹ Cf. p. 158.

the local Legislatures might be abolished everywhere throughout the Empire, the Royal veto affording a sufficient check. The relations between the Viceroy and his Ministers should resemble those binding any Colonial Governor and his Ministers, and should be parallel to the connection between the Crown and the British Cabinet.

Nor did he fail to consider carefully the Imperial budget. "All public debts of the Empire, together with other Imperial burdens, should be assumed by the Imperial Government, and that to meet this the Imperial Government should collect customs in every part of the Empire." The Imperial Government, he admitted, could not assume the whole burden of the National Debt without taking over the collection of some local tax as compensation. This might be done, he demonstrated, and four-fifths of the Debt charges be borne, by the Imperial Government assuming the greater part of the British excise as Imperial revenue. With these general adjustments, he calculated that the Imperial income and expenditure would balance. The local Government was to bear the remaining fifth of the Debt charge, until the growth of trade and customs raised the revenue to such

position that the Imperial Government could carry all. Subsidies, he said, to the extent of two millions should be granted to the Colonies, to supplement their revenues, where their source of revenue had been taken away by the absorption of Colonial in Imperial Customs. This was upon the parallel of the subsidies still paid by the Canadian Government to the several Provincial Governments. Where the Colonies were too staunch adherents to Protection, they might be allowed to have their way and be permitted to impose surplus customs similar to the *octroi* duties of the cities on the Continent. A Supreme Court of Appeal was to be established in each division of the Empire—England, British North America, the West Indies, Australia, and South Africa; the Judges were to be appointed by the Imperial Government.¹

Such was the scheme proposed by the *Westminster Review*. But before leaving it, two words might be added respecting its wisdom. The elevation of the existing Parliament into a truly Imperial House by freeing it from the encumbrance of local government

¹ *Westminster Review*, October, 1879: "Federation of the English Empire."

was a shrewd move, for it obviated the objection many raised against Federation,—that the British Parliament would never abdicate. On the other hand, although Commercial Preference might have been possible, the attempt to introduce a thorough-going Imperial tariff, such as this, would have met with insurmountable difficulties. At home, it would have run up against the full strength of the Free Trade feeling, while, in the Colonies, it would have encountered the growing and equally strong prejudice in favour of Protection. Until British Free Traders could come to see that a half loaf was better than no bread, and colonial Protectionists could rise to expand their Nationalism into Imperialism, this would continue to be a fatal defect in any scheme in which it might be incorporated. The revenue was usually the weakest point in Imperial schemes.

S. W. Kelsey,¹ writing in the *British Colonial World* and the *Journal of Commerce* in 1883-84, also advocated a scheme of federation. His chief motive was fear of foreign aggression and the necessity for colonial co-operation to face it. He denied that the existing system was all that was

S. W.
Kelsey.

¹ S. W. Kelsey, *Imperial Federation*. London, 1903.

required, and that the Colonies ought to have no *locus standi* in Europe. British foreign policy, he asserted, vitally affected the Colonies, and he supported this by several examples. When New Caledonia was seized by France in 1853, Australia was greatly disappointed, but England did nothing. Colonial interests were sacrificed also in the case of New Guinea. The Dutch and Portuguese, he continued, were bent on securing some vantage-ground in their old South African possessions. The New Hebrides, he said, and other Southern Pacific Islands which had been the subject of diplomatic arrangement, would certainly be fruitful of trouble. Surely it was to the interests of the Australians that French criminals, when incorrigible, should no longer be allowed to be transported to a haven so dangerous to Australian morals; yet they had no power to approach France concerning the arrangement, whereby the worst characters were tacitly allowed to slip across to the Australian coast. Such questions, instead of being settled by the ministers of the Crown, could be best dealt with in a great council of the nation where the Colonies being represented could express themselves. The great progress of the Colonies would

hasten the time when this would be achieved. Moreover, internal Imperial arrangements, he pointed out, required readjustment. The English tariff injured the trade in Australian wines, the duty on which was two and a half times as much as the duty on wines from France or Spain. All complaints against this injustice had been futile. If uttered in Parliament, they would have had weight which could not be attached to applications made to a Secretary of State.

Some representative system was necessary. He thought that the inclusion of the Colonial Agents-General in the House of Commons, or their investment with a sort of *quasi* diplomatic character, as suggested by Lord Derby, would aggravate rather than ease the situation. He scorned those who would cut the Gordian knot by letting the Colonies go, and proclaimed Federation as the only way out: "We believe, on the contrary, that a scheme, which, while giving each and all a large measure of Home Rule, shall likewise secure for them an adequate representation in the Imperial Parliament, would bind them to the Mother Country by ties too strong to be easily sundered." He would not let the principle of development block the way of

reform: "To meet the circumstances of the time, we must be prepared for a great constitutional change, the leading features of which shall be a large extension of local self-government, and a real representation of the Empire, both home and colonial." For this, two things, he said, were necessary: (1) "The abolition of the present Houses of Lords and Commons, and the creation of a body which shall possess similar privileges and authority, but smaller in number, and in which every part of the Empire shall be represented. (2) The grouping of the various corporate bodies throughout the Kingdom under five or six grand municipalities, who will deal with all matters of local interest, educational, sanitary, etc., etc., in their several divisions."

Like all the others, he pointed out that some radical change was rendered very urgent by the overcrowding of business in the House of Commons. "The whole legislative machine is out of gear, and the small modicum of work got through is accomplished mainly by the brilliant abilities and almost superhuman exertions of one man whom friend and foe alike regard with admiration and respect. Mr. Gladstone's retirement, can, however, hardly be long delayed. . . . The difficulty

of passing the simplest and least debatable measures increases day by day, and the question will soon be, not what grievance can be redressed, abuses remedied, anomalies removed, or condition of the people improved, but, almost in the well-known words of the Duke of Wellington, 'How the merely mechanical work of the Queen's Government can be carried on without the enforcement of rules and regulations which will curtail freedom of speech, stifle discussion, reduce the representatives of the people to ciphers, and which are alien to all the best and noblest traditions of the country.' "

As already suggested, the principle of devolution was a preliminary essential to his scheme of an Imperial Senate. England was to be divided up into eight grand municipalities, with an average population of about three millions. Their centres were to be London, York, Manchester, Birmingham, Exeter, Winchester, Oxford and Cambridge or Lincoln. Ireland was to have four—one in each province : in Munster, Cork ; in Ulster, Belfast ; in Connaught, Galway ; and in Leinster, Dublin. Aberdeen and Edinburgh he deemed sufficient divisions for Scotland. Wales, treated as one, was to have as its

capital, Cardiff. Each of these cities was to be the centre of ecclesiastical, legal, military, and commercial control of the district. Each would have its cathedral, law courts, barracks, and chamber of commerce ; each its Lord Mayor, Archbishop, Chief Justice, Military Commandant and Municipal Council of Aldermen. Each of these Councils was to be supreme within its own boundaries, with appeal from it only on Imperial interests.

The Imperial Senate, which was to be the crown of the system, would be partly official and partly elected from the Municipal Councils. One representative for a population of 250,000 was to be taken as the unit. The following was the resulting distribution of electoral seats in the United Kingdom :

England with a			
population of ...	25,000,000	should have	100 seats.
Wales with a popu-			
lation of	1,500,000	„	6 „
Ireland with a			
population of ...	6,000,000	„	24 „
Scotland with a			
population of ...	4,000,000	„	16 „
		Total	<u>146 „</u>

The Colonies, mostly possessing representative institutions like England, were to

be represented in the following proportion :

Australia with a population of	3,000,000	should have	12	seats.
South Africa with a population of	2,500,000	„	10	„
British North America with a population of	5,000,000	„	20	„
Other Colonies, West Indies, etc.		„	12	„
		Total	<u>54</u>	„

To these were added official members from the Grand Municipalities of the British Isles, —32 in number. This was a slight oversight, judging from the otherwise very symmetrical character of the scheme, for he allowed four representatives each to the Grand Municipalities of England only. This part of the scheme was not carefully thought out. Ireland, Scotland, and Wales would certainly desire their Lord Mayors, Chief Justices, and Military Commandants to be in the Senate. The former two would hardly take kindly to episcopal representation, while public opinion at that time would not have doubted the claim of Wales. To the colonial representation, he also proposed adding eighteen or twenty seats for the native races of the Empire. Such, in short, was Kelsey's

scheme, but the question raised by this last addition demands some attention.

Native
Races?

Should the native races be represented in the Imperial Government? At first Kelsey was inclined to take it as a matter of course that they should. When dealing with the inequalities of the colonial system, he said the Indian injustice was the greatest. A large native population, not only had government and taxation forced upon them, but they did not even possess any voice whereby they could point out defects or suggest improvements. He actually regarded the Colonial and the Indian problem in the same light, when he said in the one breath that the question of Colonial and Indian representation was hard. Similarly, in the figures he used to illustrate the anomaly of the colonial system, he did not distinguish between the British population and the native races. He pointed out that a House of Commons representing thirty-nine millions, through an electorate of five millions, more or less, directly taxed, governed, and controlled an Empire of six hundred million people, who were practically entirely unrepresented. Later, however, he modified his position: "The native populations of India and Africa would require special treat-

ment, but there is no reason why their claims to representation should be disregarded.”¹

Opinion generally was divided upon the subject. Labillière, speaking before the Conference of 1871, said that India was omitted in his scheme because he was advocating a union only of English-speaking peoples. Two of those who took part in the discussion which Young gathered up in his book on Imperial Federation adopted the same attitude. When “Colonus” objected to Imperial Federation or representation on the ground that India’s claim would make the numbers of such an Imperial chamber quite unwieldy, the Duke of Manchester replied that India had no claim at all, and that the scheme included only British communities. Similarly Sir Samuel Wilson, writing in the *National Review*, 1884, dismissed the case of India as being *in statu pupillari*. The only one² who definitely proposed to impose Imperial taxation upon India, fixing the amount at £850,000 for Imperial defence, remarked that India’s share could not be computed upon a basis of population.

¹ S. W. Kelsey, *Imperial Federation*. London, 1903.

² *Imperial Federation: What should be the next Step?* By a Leaguer. London, 1885.

Others, however, were inclined to recognize India's claim. Henry Kilgour, of Edinburgh, in 1869, advocated an Imperial Council in which India and Ceylon were to have eighteen representatives.¹ Sir Frederick Bowen, a man of great Colonial experience, also favoured Indian representation in some form. Writing from Hong-Kong in 1885, he advocated India's inclusion in any scheme of Imperial union as a Crown Colony on a grand scale. Former members of the Supreme Council of Calcutta, he argued, including a certain proportion of native princes, should be delegated by that body or selected by the Crown. In the following year, in a paper read before the Royal Colonial Institute,² he went farther, and pointed to the Roman Empire as an example for the gradual communication of the rights of British citizenship to the native races. Cicero, he said, thought it the main cause of the extension and consolidation of the Roman Empire. In 1887, Edwin Guthrie³ was also inclined to include Indian representation in

¹ Kilgour, *Proposed Joint Committee of the Legislatures*. London, 1869.

² *Royal Colonial Institute Proceedings*, vol. xvii.

³ Guthrie, *Home Rule and Federation*. Manchester, 1887.

his Imperial plan. Thus, some sought geographical, and some a racial union; but, on the whole, the question of India was not regarded as of pressing importance.

Sir Samuel Wilson,¹ an eminent Colonial, was another strong advocate of Imperial Federation. The Imperial expenditure, which amounted to £30,000,000 annually—£17,000,000 for the army, £10,000,000 for the navy, and £3,000,000 for diplomatic services—should, he said, be shared by the various members of the Empire according to their wealth and population. As a means of securing this, the introduction of Colonial members into the British House, he agreed, was quite impracticable, for already the House was too large, and local business quite complicated enough. "The only practical scheme, therefore," he wrote, "seems to be that of an Imperial Parliament of two Houses to deal with Imperial affairs, and also national or colonial Parliaments to deal with the necessary legislation for each nation or Colony."

He adopted the general attitude in favour of two chambers. These two Houses were each to consist of one hundred members.

¹ *National Review*, November, 1884; *Nineteenth Century*, April, 1885.

Each member would represent a population of 460,000. With this, as a basis, England would receive 55 members, Scotland 9, Ireland 11, Canada 12, Australia and Tasmania 8, New Zealand 2, Cape Colony 1, and other Colonies 2, making a total of 100. The Lower House was to be elected by all the Lower Houses of the Empire, and the Upper Chamber by all the Upper Chambers. Thus he would not, as the *Westminster Review* had advised,¹ abolish second chambers in all the provincial Legislatures.

The erection of such an institution could be made possible only by breaking up the existing Parliament—both Houses—into their geographical divisions. The commoners of England would legislate with the peers of England for the welfare of England. Scotland and Ireland would be governed similarly. All this, however, could not be accomplished at one stroke, even though it should solve the Irish and Imperial questions simultaneously.

Though he held this up as the ideal to be kept firmly in view, he favoured the expedient of the Council of Agents-General, suggested by Lord Grey and by Montagu

¹ Cf. p. 173.

Burrows. The first move towards the plan he had outlined might, he said, be the extension of the powers of Grand Committees of the House of Commons, and their formation in the House of Lords, to deal with local questions. Their decisions might be vested with the authority of law, except when declared *ultra vires* by the legal advisers. The next step would be the introduction of colonial representatives into both Houses. Though they would possess seats, their rights should be restricted; they should be eligible to sit only on Imperial Committees. Finally, he said, the Grand Committees could be granted the power to sit in London, Ireland, or Scotland, and the plan would be practically completed. It was indeed an ingenious scheme, and it is only a matter for regret that he did not apply his ingenuity to the problem of Imperial revenue.

Sir G. F. Bowen was another ardent advocate of Imperial Federation. Though he agreed with Lords Grey and Lorne in their advocacy of a Council, he emphasized the fact that such could only be a temporary measure preparing the way for a closer union. A Federation like Germany and the United States would, he said, be imperative at some

Sir G. F.
Bowen.

future date, if the Empire was to be held together permanently. Ten million Europeans were in the Colonies. These Colonies, which were growing rapidly, would not bear any Imperial burdens without being granted a corresponding share in the management of affairs.¹ The National Assemblies of France, Spain, and Portugal, he pointed out, all included colonial representatives. England was the only colonizing nation which excluded her Colonies from a voice in her councils.²

The question of Irish Home Rule was before the public. About the same time as Bowen wrote from Hong-Kong, G. B. Lancaster Woodbourne³ proposed Imperial Federation as the only common solution for the overcrowding of business in the House of Commons, the Irish question, and the various problems of Empire. Thus it was but natural that Bowen, himself an Irishman, should also advance the pressure for Home Rule as an argument in favour of Federation.⁴ He regarded Home Rule as inevitable, and reasoned

¹ Substance of a Letter from Sir G. F. Bowen. Hong-Kong, 1885.

² *Ibid.*

³ *National Review*, July, 1885: "Imperial Federation and Home Rule."

⁴ *Royal Colonial Institute Proceedings*, vol. xvii.

that the only system which could render it safe for the Empire would be Federation.

He was much impressed by Seeley's book, and reiterated that the Colonists regarded the Empire as an expansion of England. England, instead of seeking, like Ireland, to have a Parliament exclusively to herself, had been selfishly ambitious ; her Parliament had clung jealously to all the powers of Imperial Government. If continued, this could not but be fatal. On the other hand, he thought no half measures would suffice. Quoting John Stuart Mill's *Representative Government*, he said that Federal government, to be successful and permanent, should be a real Federation like that existing in the United States or Germany, but not like the imperfect Federal Governments of the United States between the Declaration of Independence and the adoption of the new Constitution in 1789, or like the German Confederation (*Bund*) between 1815 and 1867. Though a strong Imperialist, Bowen did not frame a new system, but was content simply to adopt in its entirety the scheme proposed by Sir Samuel Wilson¹ in the *National Review* as the one approaching nearest to his ideal.

¹ Cf. p. 185.

Edwin
Guthrie.

Many others, such as Forster¹ and J. S. Little,² advocated Imperial Federation in general; they were concerned rather for the advancement of the idea, and did not trouble about any definite proposal. Edwin Guthrie, however, proposed a very good plan.³ He first advanced it in a paper read at the Rushholme Liberal Club, August 3, 1886. The question of Home Rule had become very urgent. In his title he put it before Federation. His scheme, however, was to solve three problems simultaneously. The Irish demand for Home Rule would be satisfied, the injustice of Imperial relations would be righted, and the reform of the House of Lords would be effected, all at once. As the Colonies had their own separate national Parliaments, England, Ireland, Scotland, and Wales were to have theirs, the present House of Commons being broken up. The House of Lords was to be replaced by an Imperial Parliament consisting of elective representatives from the whole Empire. Such a scheme, he declared, "would secure

¹ Forster, *Imperial Federation*. London, 1885.

² J. S. Little, *The United States of Britain*. Guildford, 1886.

³ *Home Rule and Federation*. Manchester, 1887.

the maximum of national liberty with the greatest possible Imperial power and unity. It would be a vast simplification of Government and unification of taxation.”¹ It would, he continued, secure the protection of minorities, and would embody the fullest attainment of the representative principle.

The new Federal Constitution was to be first adopted for the United Kingdom, but it would not be obligatory upon the Colonies, which might be allowed to enter the union at will. The functions of the Imperial Government were summed up as follows: the control of the army and navy, and defence generally; the management of the Imperial revenue and expenditure; the creation and management of Courts of Final Appeal; the administration of Foreign Affairs; and the exercise of veto power over Bills of the National Parliaments, which by a vote of the Imperial House were declared an undue invasion of personal rights and liberties, or an unwarranted usurpation of Imperial prerogative.

London, of course, was to be the seat of the Imperial Government. This was to

¹ What exactly he meant by this is uncertain. Perhaps he meant to establish some form of Imperial taxation.

consist of two chambers, both elected for three years. Differences of territory and of population were to be represented in the Imperial Assembly. Its members were not to be chosen by the various colonial or national Legislatures, but were to be elected by the people voting in regular electoral districts.¹ This would afford a much better representation to all classes of opinion and shades of thought.

His Imperial Senate was to fulfil a function not yet recognized by any other Imperialist—the territorial representation of the different parts of the Empire. As if federating independent States, Guthrie equalized the status of all countries in the Empire by giving five senators to each. The smaller disconnected settlements, however, were each to have only one. This was quite a new departure, and was, perhaps, more essential to a British Imperial Federation than to a German or an American Federation, for, when separated by oceans, the various parts of the Empire could never have their interests assimilated or merged to such a degree as has been the case with the contiguous States of America or Germany.

¹ Cf. p. 157 *et seq.*

Frederick Wicks, writing in the *National Review*,¹ suggested something like Kelsey's plan. At first he considered the creation of an entirely new Imperial Chamber composed of members elected and returned to it by the various Legislatures, including representatives from the existing House of Commons. In this Chamber, or Imperial Council, would sit the Ministers connected with the Admiralty, War, and India Offices, as well as the First Lord of the Treasury and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. This Assembly would have full power to tax both the Home Country and the Colonies for Imperial purposes, particularly that of Defence. It would conduct foreign relations and supervise the affairs of the Empire generally.

Frederick
Wicks.

Such, he said, would be the boldest scheme, but it would not be the most practical. The pride of the existing Parliament would not submit to be thus lowered. A wiser and more acceptable plan would be the transformation of the House of Commons, as had been advocated² by the *Westminster Review*.

¹ *National Review*, September, 1886: "The Confederation of the Empire Practically Considered."

² Cf. p. 170.

Instead of being superseded, it should be freed of all parochial duties, and thrown open to colonial representatives.

The business thus eliminated would devolve upon provincial assemblies, resembling Kelsey's grand municipalities,¹ except in being more numerous. Ireland was to have five, Scotland seven, Wales two, England eleven or twelve such Governments. To them would be left the supervision of railways, canals, roads and bridges, and the power of imposing taxes for these and other local purposes. As a check upon these provincial assemblies, their by-laws were to be submitted for endorsement to the Home Secretary or Board of Trade, just as Provisional Orders were already submitted to that office.

Here Wicks stopped short, leaving many important details untouched. He merely expressed a preference that the colonial representatives be elected by their various assemblies rather than by the people directly, as the simplest method, and the one most likely to produce the best men.

Con-
clusion.

Through all these proposals of Federation runs one underlying idea. Some might exalt

¹ Cf. p. 179.

the existing Parliament by purging it of all local business, and others might debase it to erect a new Government above its head ; some might regard its great Imperial pretensions, while others recognized only the little Imperial business it actually did ; but all agreed that there should be some great Imperial Parliament in which every part of the Empire should be represented, a Parliament which should manage all matters pertaining to the Empire, and recognize as sacred the principle of local self-government. It was not to be a new section of the existing scheme of Government ; it was to be the crown of the representative system—the perfection of parliamentary Government.

CHAPTER X

AN IMPERIAL COUNCIL

An Ex-
pedient.

THOUGH Federation was the ideal of all Imperialists, those who wished to accomplish that end at one stroke were not very practical. An Imperial Council was the generally accepted expedient. Even such an ardent devotee of Federation as Labillière recognized the necessity of some transitional stages, and, like the rest, was inclined toward some kind of Council representing the Empire and advising the existing British Government in its conduct of Imperial affairs. "We should not perhaps at first attempt to set up a very complete Federal Government. Our object may probably be best reached by beginning with the simplest form of Federation we can devise—perhaps one of those systems which I have spoken of as temporary expedients, always keeping in view and moving forward towards something more perfect; for the history of Federation in America, Germany,

and Switzerland, where it has had as many and greater difficulties to surmount as any it will have with us to encounter, shows that the tendency of the system, when once it is planted, is to take root, grow, and ripen into greater perfection."¹ But Labillière's strong idealism could not be possessed by everyone. Many believing Federation too far beyond the reach of present possibility, applied themselves to find other means of drawing the Empire closer together, silently hoping that, when once started, the movement towards union might finally culminate in Federation. These, generally, hit upon the plan of an Imperial Council.

It was just about the time of the foundation of the Royal Colonial Institute that the general idea arose of a Council of Advice somewhat analogous to the Indian Council. Of all the proposals made, only one stands out prominently—that of C. W. Eddy, which was championed after his death by Lords Grey and Lorne. But beside his plan for the revival of an obsolete committee of the Privy Council, there were many other schemes and suggestions. Some were definite, others indefinite ; some adopted the representative

The
Proposals.

¹ *Royal Colonial Institute Proceedings*, vol. vi.

principle, while others omitted it as unnecessary or inadvisable ; some limited its function to mere advice, while others proposed giving it regular authority of legislation or of administration, or even, as Young suggested, of voting colonial subsidies.

Henry
Kilgour.

One of the earliest proposals of a Council was made by Henry Kilgour of Edinburgh.¹ The rebellion in India was the immediate cause of the first publication of his scheme in 1858. In 1869 it was expanded, framed as an Act of Parliament, and enclosed in a letter to Gladstone. Its full title, "Proposed Institution of a Joint Committee of the Legislatures and Governments of the Empire, having Periodical Meetings in London," well sums up the lengthy meaning of the proposal. It was to be a Council of about 250, whereof half were to be nominated by the Crown directly, or indirectly through the Governors, and half to be appointed by the various local Legislatures. Everyone in the Empire was thus to be represented in London. Even India and Ceylon, as already mentioned,² were allowed eighteen native representatives.

The power and authority of the Imperial

¹ Kilgour, *The British Empire*. London, 1869.

² Cf. p. 184.

Parliament, as of the various Colonial Parliaments, he proposed, should remain untouched, for to this Joint Committee he would give no legislative power or taxing authority whatever. Its purpose was rather to establish a "solemn express, authoritative, and frequently recurring recognition throughout the Empire of its common monarchy; and of the brotherhood and unity of interests of its inhabitants; and for the strengthening of these sentiments and the promotion of these interests." It was to consult on Imperial affairs, and, where they deemed it wise, to confer with the Imperial and Colonial Legislatures. The author held that "gathered from so many regions of the earth, and elected by so many constituents, it would present the most varied, interesting, and useful assembly the world ever saw." This, about the earliest definite proposal, seems to have been quite generally ignored. The Imperial movement in the nineteenth century constituted a clearly defined development of a regular body of opinion connected by a network of cross-references. But this proposal stands completely apart, related by no reference to the main body of Imperial thought. Accordingly, it is of interest only in itself and not

for any part it contributed to the development of opinion.

*West-
minster
Review.*

Shortly afterwards, the *Westminster Review*¹ advocated a Colonial Council presided over by the Secretary of State, and invested with actual powers, such as the control of the appointment of Governors and other colonial officers nominated in England, the regulation of the tariff, the conduct of emigration, and the appropriation of unoccupied waste-lands. The duties of the Council were to be largely executive. In dealing with matters relating to particular Colonies, the Minister would be guided chiefly by the representatives of that particular dependency. To secure the full confidence of the Colonies, it would have to possess a representative character. Canada, it was proposed, should send five members, one for each principal division; Australia five; New Zealand two; the West Indies, four; and Cape Colony, Natal, the West African Coast, Mauritius and the Eastern Islands, one member each. The Secretary or Under-Secretary of State was deemed a sufficient representative of home interests. Represented in such a Council, it was urged that the Colonies would

¹ *Westminster Review*, July, 1870: "Future of the British Empire."

probably be quite willing to pay such contributions as it might fix towards the naval and military expenditure of the Empire.

W. Jardine Smith¹ of Melbourne, however, Jardine
Smith. preferred a Council less directly representative, and possessed of no definite power. He urged the formation of a Supreme Council for the consideration of external affairs and other matters in which the whole Empire was interested. This project of a Council rather than a united Parliament, he affirmed, was clearly the favourite idea of Colonials. It was one greatly facilitated by the appointment of Agents-General in London to represent all the larger Colonies. These, he said, might well serve as a nucleus of a Council of Advice for the Colonial Secretary, on the general parallel of the India Council.

The Duke of Manchester, writing in *The Colonies*, criticized Eddy's idea of admitting colonial representatives into the Privy Council, saying that English public opinion would prevent it.² The Duke
of Man-
chester. The only feasible scheme, he said, was the creation of a new Chamber, or Council, in which England and the Colonies

¹ *Royal Colonial Institute Proceedings*, vol. vi.; Eddy, *Imperial Federation*.

² Young, *Imperial Federation*, letter vi. London, 1876.

should be represented in due proportion. It was objected that the Colonial Secretary, for whose guidance this Council was to be collected, would not consult it. This he answered by saying that the Council, holding the purse-strings of the Colonies, would, as the House of Commons had many centuries before, grow gradually into power. "Let the Colonies," he said, "vote subsidies for naval and military purposes, and their voice in the government of the Empire will be in proportion to the subsidies they vote." Like Jardine Smith, Manchester also thought he was creating a parallel with the India Council.¹

"Colo-
nus."

The Duke was not the only one among those who engaged in that discussion to advocate a Council. An anonymous Australian, "Colonus,"² fell in with the idea, affirming that it had real merits. The Colonial Office, he said, needed "more direct local information." But his Council of Advice was somewhat different. He feared the inclusion of leading colonists as tending to arouse petty local jealousies, and thought that the Colonies should elect from among

¹ Young, *Imperial Federation*, letter xxii.

² *Ibid.*, letter ix.

those who had held commissions as Governor. But though attachments spring up and subsist between the Colonies and their Governors, and though the latter usually are men of great influence in England, still, the exclusion of Colonists would have given rise to much more trouble than their inclusion.

Manchester's idea of a council growing into power was also advanced, ten years later, by Frederick Wicks. "Let the Colonies," he said, "return representatives to a Colonial Assembly sitting in London, under the Presidency of the Secretary of State for the Colonies for the time being, and let them take into consideration Imperial questions, and deliver their opinion upon them." Then, although they might possess no legal authority, they would soon acquire great prestige. It would, he further urged, greatly quicken Colonial interest in the Empire.¹

Before proceeding to discuss the great plan with which Grey's name has been associated, another curious proposal should be noticed. It was first made in 1874, during the discussion following upon Eddy's paper.

¹ *National Review*, September, 1886: "Confederation of the Empire."

F. Wicks.

A group of
Colonial
Secre-
taries.

Mr. Haliburton, a son of the famous Canadian judge and novelist ("Sam Slick"), proposed that in time there should be appointed a Secretary of State for each group of Colonies corresponding to the Indian Secretary.¹ A similar suggestion was also made by George Baden Powell in 1886.² He remarked that just as there was a tendency "to give over the Executive affairs of England, Ireland, Scotland, and India to separate Ministers, so the Secretary of State for the Colonies might have the assistance of separate secretaries for Canada, for Australia, and for South Africa. Such a step would at once secure the responsible representation in the Imperial Government of these great groups of Colonies."³ These two proposals, however, do not seem to have been well considered. Although they might have worked, the application of them would have been very likely to promote diversity instead of harmony of interests. The representatives from the various Colonies would never come together officially. The whole arrangement seems to have been carefully planned upon the parallel of India, an example quite inapplicable.

¹ *Royal Colonial Institute Proceedings*, vol. vi.

² *Contemporary Review*, October, 1886.

³ *Ibid.*

India, having to be governed from the Home Country, required some such elaborate machinery, but the Colonies, possessing self-government, stood in no such need.

The most popular scheme of all was the revival of the Colonial Committee of the Privy Council, and the introduction into it of colonial members, preferably the Agents-General. The original author of this idea was not Lord Grey, as was commonly supposed, but C. W. Eddy.

In his paper read at Glasgow, in October, 1874, Eddy said: "In furtherance of this project of a Supreme Council, I some time ago submitted to an assembly of Colonists a scheme which was received with a certain amount of favour, though it was acknowledged to be hopeless to put it before the Government of the day. . . . It is one that has received the approval of so profound a student of constitutional history as Mr. Froude, who wrote on it as follows: 'The machinery of the Privy Council is, as you say, made to hand for a judicious reconstruction of the colonial relations.'

"My proposal was not to attempt to create *de novo* a power unknown to the constitution that we all revere, but . . . to take

advantage of the machinery provided by . . . 'the Queen's Most Honourable Privy Council' by reviving in a manner suited to the present and prospective exigencies of our Colonies, that department of it which was formed under the name of the Committee of the Privy Council of Trade and Foreign Plantations, and so constructing a branch of the Council for advice on the general concerns of the whole Empire, in like manner as the Judicial Committee of the Council is constituted as the Court of Final Appeal on legal matters. I showed that the Cabinet, whose only legal status is that it consists only of Privy Councillors, and is, in fact, a committee of that body, may be regarded as the standing committee for general purposes, and is supposed to represent the prevailing public opinion of the kingdom for the time being ; that it is necessarily in harmony with the House of Commons, but with that only ; and that an analogous committee for counsel and advice, in which the Colonists as well as the Mother Country should be represented, would apparently provide the whole machinery necessary for the Government of the Empire. Each division of the Empire, and each self-governing Colony or group, should be repre-

sented in it in proportion to its numbers ; hence the British representatives would, for the present, be four or five times as numerous as those of the Colonies together, but this proportion would vary *pari passu* with the more rapid growth of the younger portions of the Empire."

The Agents-General of the Colonies, he remarked, would naturally be the chosen representatives of each. "All who are once made members of the Privy Council are members for life, but those only can attend its meetings who are summoned ; therefore the Colonies might change their representatives as often as they pleased, though the appointment would confer a certain dignity for life. The spheres of this committee would be confined to advice on a few simple but grand subjects ; peace, war, diplomacy, the marshalling of the forces in time of war, the proper quota or contingent of forces to be furnished by each Colony for Imperial purposes, the distribution of the Imperial garrisons and ships.

"Holding, as I do, that a Legislative Union of the Empire is at present impossible, I yet believe that a Federal Union is quite practicable, and may be accomplished without difficulty by the formation

of a Federal Council such as I have indicated."

Lord :
Grey.

It is uncertain just when Eddy first formulated this plan and proposed it as he mentioned. Most probably it was connected in some way with the Royal Colonial Institute. Westgarth, speaking before that Society in 1872, referred to the scheme as familiar to his hearers, and as an improvement suggested that "prominent colonists in this country—including, for instance, ex-Governors of the principal Colonies—might be drafted into the Privy Council." He regretted the total neglect of the ex-Governors, not only for their own sakes, but because it deprived the country of their varied and most valuable experience.¹

But Eddy, the originator of the idea, did not live to become its chief exponent. That duty devolved upon Lord Grey, who, five years later, wrote in the *Nineteenth Century*,² urging such a scheme as the only answer to the question, "How shall we retain the Colonies?" He marked the disintegrating tendencies at work in the Empire as it existed, especially the

¹ *Royal Colonial Institute Proceedings*, vol. iii.

² *Nineteenth Century*, June, 1879.

commercial policies of the various Colonies. As an illustration, he used the assertion of the Australian delegates, when they met to discuss the removal of restrictions from their power of controlling their tariffs, that "Great Britain must logically do one of two things—either leave the Colonies unfettered discretion, or, if she is to regulate tariffs or reciprocal tariff arrangements, or to make treaties affecting the Colonies, give to the Colonies representation in matters affecting the Empire." It will be wise to quote Lord Grey at length, not only to prove by the close parallel of the language that Eddy, and not Grey, was the real author, but also because it was he who expanded the idea and made it popular. In discussing the situation, Grey did not hesitate to recognize the Colonial claim embodied in the above quotation. He emphasized the fact that "some effectual means should be afforded to them of making their wishes and opinions heard by that Government before it comes to decisions in which they are concerned." He ridiculed the idea of representation in the House of Commons, and proposed instead the following plan: "A Committee of the Privy Council to be formed for the

purpose of considering and reporting its opinion to Her Majesty on such questions affecting the Colonies as Her Majesty, on the advice of her Ministers, might think fit to refer to it. Her Majesty to signify her readiness, on the recommendation of the Colonial Governments which have agents in this country with suitable salaries, to appoint them to be members of her Privy Council, and also of the Committee on Colonial Affairs, so long as they held their posts as agents. Already the appointment of agents in this country is conferred by some of the more important Colonies on one of their leading men, and it is probable that this would be done more frequently if the appointment, by the arrangement just suggested, were invested with an importance calculated to make it an object of ambition, and to give them greater authority in their communication with Her Majesty's Government. The advice and assistance of eminent colonists might be expected to be of great value in the proposed Committee and also to the Secretary of State in a less formal manner. In referring any question to the Committee, Her Majesty to direct such members of her Privy Council as she might think fit to be

summoned to assist the colonial members of the Committee in considering it. On important subjects, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and perhaps some of his colleagues, would probably take part in the deliberations of the Committee, and it is to be hoped that in some cases at least party feeling would not prevent the aid of former Ministers from being also obtained and from proving of great utility. No Colonial Acts to be disallowed by Her Majesty without having been first considered and reported upon by this Committee, which would, in fact, be merely reverting to an ancient practice of the Government, which is still kept up in form though not in substance. In the early days of the British Colonies the authority of the Crown over them was mainly exercised through the Committee of the Council for Trade and Plantations, now called the Board of Trade; and though its functions with regard to the Colonies have long since been transferred to the Secretary of State, the form of referring Colonial Acts to it is still adhered to, and the assent to them of the Crown, or their disallowance, is signified by the approval by Her Majesty in Council of reports which nominally proceed

from it, though really from the Colonial Office. The proposed change in the constitution of the Committee to which these are referred, and making the consideration they receive from it real instead of nominal, might facilitate an arrangement for bringing into use the power of the Crown to withhold its assent from Colonial Acts calculated to injure the general interests of the Empire. But it is by no means exclusively or chiefly with regard to the allowance or disallowance of Colonial Acts that the advice of the proposed Committee would be useful. There are a variety of subjects with regard to which it would be of very great value. In discussions which arise from time to time with foreign nations on matters affecting the welfare of the Colonies . . . it would be of great advantage to Her Majesty's Government to have in the Committee a body which would both give it information as to the wishes and opinions of the Colonies, and assist in conveying to the Colonies authentic explanations of the reasons for the measures adopted. Again, when disputes arise between Colonies, such as that which took place between New South Wales and Victoria, as to the amount each was entitled to from the

receipts from import duties, the proposed Committee would be able to give important assistance to the Government in deciding what ought to be done. Nor would this assistance be less valuable in dealing with such difficult questions as that which Victoria has recently brought under the consideration of the Home Government with reference to the differences which have arisen between the two branches of the Legislature."

Though this plan was first enunciated by ^{Revived.} Eddy, and later by Earl Grey, it was not taken up at once. It was destined to lie on one side for still six years until Grey himself revived it in the *Pall Mall Gazette* of January 9, 1885, acting apparently on a suggestion dropped at a meeting of the Royal Colonial Institute in 1884, or stimulated perhaps by Montagu Burrows's proposal, of an Advisory Council, in the *National Review* of the previous November.

Lord Lorne¹ then threw himself into the ^{Lord Lorne.} scheme, and to its wisdom added the weight of his authority as Governor-General of Canada and son-in-law of the Queen. Westgarth had proposed the inclusion of ex-Governors in the Council, but Lorne sug-

¹ *Pall Mall Gazette*, January 13, 1885.

gested the addition of the Governors at the time they were actually performing their duties. "The Governor," he said, "should see all the public correspondence between his Ministers and their Agent, and, though absent from England, be also an *ex-officio* member of any such Privy Council Board. This body would form a Council of Envoys, to whom should be added only those British Ministers who have direct relations with Colonial affairs—namely, the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Any additional nominations might open the door to suspicions that the British members desired more than the proper share of influence in the deliberation of the matters discussed."

He urged the Government to "consult with the Colonial Cabinets, and ask them if they do not think that we can obtain by regular and recognized conference with their envoys more intimate knowledge of the desires of their people, further opportunity for them to bring their wishes directly to the notice of England and of brother-colonists, a better chance for them to combine to further the views of one of their number or declare

against any impracticable project, less danger that any imprudent course shall be entered on by any one Colony without consultation with others and with Britain, a time of discussion for any schemes for joint defence—in short, less isolation and consequently greater strength for any policy taken up with forethought. The Secretary of State would be supported in adopting any given line by knowing he had the Empire at his back, or, by finding himself alone, would know when to advise withdrawal.”¹

This scheme, formulated by two men holding such a large place in the public eye, naturally became very popular. Many leaders joined in advocating the institution of this Council. Among them were Sir Samuel Wilson and W. E. Forster, both writing in the *Nineteenth Century*, and Sir G. F. Bowen in his letter to Forster. This idea of a Council seized firm hold upon the imagination of the Imperial-thinking public as no other proposal had ever done, and its realization was what most people hoped from the Imperial Federation League.

¹ *Nineteenth Century*, March, 1885.

CHAPTER XI

THE IMPERIAL FEDERATION LEAGUE : CONCLUSION

THE final fruit of this Imperial movement was the institution of the Imperial Federation League¹ in 1884. It originated from a suggestion made by Labillière to Captain Colomb. Along with Sir George Baden Powell, William Westgarth, J. Denistoun Wood, and Sir Frederick Young, they formed a committee. They approached the Right Hon. W. E. Forster, M.P., and a number of other prominent politicians, with the view of holding a large meeting for the inauguration of their scheme, and were rewarded by securing Forster as their leader.²

1884.
July Con-
ference.

By special invitation, a large number of public men, from various political camps at home and from all parts of the Empire,

¹ *Report of the Westminster Palace Hotel Conference.* London, 1884.

² Labillière, *Federal Britain.* London, 1894.

met at the Westminster Palace Hotel, July 29, 1884.

Among the letters read at the opening of the meeting, was one written by Professor Seeley, the following passage from which affords a fine preface to all that followed: "How else can it be accounted for, that on the question of unity of the Empire, the majority of Englishmen have actually no opinion? And this not because they have considered it with anxious care, and have been unable to arrive at a conclusion, but because they have never considered it, have never studied it, and have no knowledge about it at all?" It was to remedy this great defect that the League was formed. The purpose of this organization was well expressed in the opening speech of the chairman, W. E. Forster. "The main object of our meeting here to-day," he said, "and of the society which we hope to form, will be to keep constantly the idea and aim of Union before all classes of the British public, both at home and in the Colonies . . . and especially to show to the masses and to the working men that it is to their interest as much as to the interest of the capitalists that we should keep together, so that our rulers,

Its aim.

both here and in the Colonies, should let slip no opportunity, as circumstances change from day to day, of developing this idea of union and of hastening the realization of this principle of Federation, than which, I believe, there is none more fraught with beneficence to England and even to the world."

Among the speakers were the following: the Earl of Rosebery; the Right Hon. W. H. Smith, M.P.; Sir Charles Tupper, High Commissioner for Canada, and former Premier of Nova Scotia; the Earl of Wemyss; R. Dobell, Esq.; E. Stanhope, M.P.; the Marquis of Normanby; Hon. Oliver Mowatt, Premier of Ontario; and W. Gisborne, Esq., of New Zealand. After considerable discussion, three resolutions were passed unanimously:

Resolutions.

1. "That in order to secure the permanent unity of the Empire, some form of Federation is essential.

2. "That for the purpose of influencing public opinion, both in the United Kingdom and the Colonies, as to the incalculable advantages which will accrue to the whole Empire from the adoption of such a system of political organization, a Society be formed of men of all parties to advocate and support the principle of Federation.

3. "That this Conference refers to a Committee all details connected with the establishment and organization of such a Society, for a report thereon to be submitted for the consideration and approval of an adjourned Conference to be held at a suitable period in the ensuing year."

The spirit of the whole meeting is best set forth in the following minute of the views of the preliminary Committee as submitted to the Conference at its opening :

Minutes
of the
Com-
mittee.

"1. That in order to maintain the permanent unity of the Empire, some extension of its political organization will be indispensable, so that the large and rapidly increasing population of the Empire beyond the seas may have an adequate voice in the control of foreign relations, defence, and all other common interests and concerns, and may take a fresh share in sustaining Imperial responsibilities.

"2. That the time has arrived when those who feel the need of some political organization for this purpose should openly advocate such a policy.

"3. That, whilst there should no longer be any hesitation on the part of the advocates of the unity of the Empire in pointing to Federation as the end they have ultimately in view, they should at present avoid embarrassing the question by attempting specifically to lay

down the details of a Federal organization for the Empire, neither should they prescribe the time within which the establishment of such a Federation should take place.

“4. That in order to attain the end in view, it is openly necessary to bring home to the minds of the people of this country and of the Colonies the advantage of the permanent unity and ultimate Federation of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australasia, South Africa and the other British Colonies, as our great national aim in the future, the details being left to be adjusted by those authentically empowered to arrange them on behalf of this country and the Colonies, when the time shall arrive for the formation of such a Federation.

“5. That if the permanent unity of the Empire be kept in clear view, and the nature of Federal Government be well considered, its adoption will not be difficult, even if the growth of the Colonies, or the circumstances of the Empire, should require it to be carried out sooner than may be expected.

“6. The Committee recommend the formation of a Society for the special object of enlightening¹ public opinion throughout the Empire as to the advantages of permanent unity and as to the nature and different forms of Federal Government, so that the people of

¹ This word was objected to and altered by the meeting to “influencing” (*cf.* resolution, 2).

the Empire, both in these isles and beyond the seas, may be the better able to decide as to the exact form of that Government which they may prefer whenever they shall feel that the time has arrived for its adoption."

This minute, together with the resolutions adopted, was forwarded to the Colonial Secretary, the High Commissioner for Canada, the Agents-General for the Australian Colonies, and the Governors of the Colonies that did not possess Agents-General.

The adjourned Conference met on November 18, 1884, instead of in the following year November Conference. according to the wording of the resolution, and the society which became so well known as the Imperial Federation League was formed. Its avowed aim was to secure by Federation the permanent unity of the Empire, preserving at the same time the existing rights of local Parliaments regarding local affairs. The League was to be strictly non-partisan, and the membership was to be open to all British subjects who would subscribe to its principle and pay a yearly fee of one shilling. Arrangements were made for the creation of branches wherever possible. Their great end was to be secured by every legitimate means—meetings, lectures, publications, the

collection and dissemination of statistics, and the general interchange of knowledge and opinions. The great precedent of the Corn Law League was clearly before them, and they adopted its vigorous tactics. So enthusiastic were they, that one cannot read the current literature of that day without being struck with their strong conviction of certain victory.

Climax of
the Imperial
Movement.

For two reasons this Imperial Federation League is the culmination of the Imperial agitation which falls within the period of this discussion. One is, it led directly to the meeting of the First Colonial Conference in 1887, which was the first official political recognition that the Imperial problem required an Imperial solution. The League carried on its work with great energy. Branch or allied leagues were not only established all over Great Britain, but even throughout the Colonies, and the whole movement attracted to itself much public attention. The time seemed ripening fast for the final achievement of its purpose. The Home Rule controversy ; the crisis in Egypt, culminating in a spirited campaign where Australian and Canadian troops participated ; the Russian scare in 1885, when both the Cape

and Australia feared a Russian attack on their ports ; the alarm over the aggressive policy of France and Germany in the Southern Pacific Islands—all seemed to hasten the hoped-for event. The League waxed very strong, and seizing the opportunity of the Indian and Colonial Exhibition in July, 1886, it convened a Conference, largely attended by colonial visitors. Papers were read by Professor Seeley, Lord Carnarvon, Lord Rosebery, and Sir Alexander T. Galt, the retired Canadian Finance Minister, who advocated a commercial union of the Empire together with a joint system of defence and a Federal solution of the Irish problem. When, in the following month, the League waited upon the Prime Minister, they were very cordially received, and three months later Edward Stanhope, the Secretary of State, sent out invitations to the Governments of the "Colonies under Responsible Government," asking them to send representatives to a Colonial Conference, to meet in the following spring. Thus the end of the Federation League—a political union of the Empire—seemed to be almost achieved.

Successful
interview
with the
Prime
Minister.

The
Colonial
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moned.

But this hope was never realized, and its failure suggests the other reason for regard-

ing the Federation League as the beginning of a new era. The third paragraph in Stanhope's despatch, conveying to the Colonial Governments the purpose of the projected Conference, ran as follows: "The question which is at once urgent and capable of useful consideration is that of organization for military defence. The patriotic action of the Colonies in offering contingents of troops to take part in the Egyptian campaign made a deep and a lasting impression on the public mind, and was the first practical result of much careful work during recent years. . . . The close and thorough examination of the whole subject of Imperial Defence, which was completed by the Royal Commission presided over by the Earl of Carnarvon, has led to the execution of extensive and important defensive works in various parts of the Empire, and the cordial co-operation offered to Her Majesty's Government by the Colonies in carrying out this policy indicates their desire to arrive, so far as may at present be practicable, at a common basis of action."¹ But the League, on the other hand, had petitioned the Prime Minister to summon a Conference

¹ Jebb, *The Imperial Conference*. Edinburgh, 1911.

with the express purpose of forming an Imperial Council. A comparison of this request with the above despatch reveals the change about to occur in the development of Imperialism. From the opening of the Conference on April 4, 1887, the problem of Imperial Defence, formulated in the despatch, and the cause of Imperial Preference urged during the course of the Conference by Griffith of Queensland and Hofmeyr of South Africa, grew in importance.

Men approaching the Imperial problem from the standpoint of practical politics ^{Conclusion.} began to recognize its stupendous magnitude. The opening of the first Colonial Conference closed the door on *ideal* Imperialism and ushered in *practical* Imperialism. The era of ideal Imperialism was very fruitful of paper plans. The age of practical Imperialism is not less concerned with the ideal, but more engaged in its fulfilment—the attempt to build a far greater political structure than the world has yet seen. The finest pile of brick or stone may be the work of a single imagination, but this, the greatest political edifice, the United British Empire, must unite the wisdom of many minds and be compounded of the plans of many Imperial Architects.

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